Dates: c. 500 · Wikipedia
Summary: The anonymous Christian Neoplatonist who wrote under the name of Paul's Athenian
convert (Acts 17:34) gives the privation answer its most rigorous ancient statement. In a long stretch of
The Divine Names (ch. 4) he argues that evil is nothing positive at all: not a nature, not a
substance, not a rival first principle, but a “parasitical” failing that exists only by borrowing
the being of the good it corrupts. Evil is not from the Good and is not in God, angels, souls,
bodies, or matter as such; wherever it appears it is a weakness, a falling-short, a “missing of aim.”
And it never escapes providence, which “uses even evils… for the benefit” of the whole. This
is the text Aquinas would lean on when he fixed the Western doctrine of privatio boni.
The Evil is not from the Good, and if it is from the Good, it is not the Evil. For, it is not the nature of fire to make cold, nor of good to bring into being things not good; and if all things that be are from the Good (for to produce and to preserve is natural to the Good, but to destroy and to dissolve, to the Evil), there is no existing thing from the Evil, nor will the Evil itself be, if it should be evil even to itself.
— The Divine Names, ch. 4, §XIX, source.1 The argument is aimed squarely at the dualist — Manichee, Gnostic, or pagan — who would make evil a second, dark first principle warring with the good. Dionysius answers that a cause produces only what is like itself, as fire cannot make cold; so a wholly evil source could originate nothing, and could not even sustain itself. There are not two ultimate principles: “a Unit will be source of every dual.”
…wherefore the Evil has not a subsistence, but a parasitical subsistence, coming into being for the sake of the Good, and not of itself.
— The Divine Names, ch. 4, §XXXI, source.2 The image is precise: evil is a parasite. Just as disease is “a defect of order, not total” — for a body totally deprived of the good would simply cease to be — evil subsists only by clinging to some remaining good. It has no positive nature of its own; it is what the good is not. Gathering the point, Dionysius piles up the privatives:
The Evil then is privation and failure, and want of strength, and want of proportion, and want of attainment, and want of purpose; and without beauty, and without life, and without mind, and without reason… and being itself nothing in any manner of way whatever.
— The Divine Names, ch. 4, §XXXII, source.3 This is the sharpest form of the privatio boni thesis in the ancient church — the same answer Basil and Gregory of Nyssa had stated in Greek and Augustine in Latin, here worked out with a Neoplatonist's metaphysical thoroughness.
How, in short, are there evils when there is a Providence?… But Providence, as befits Its goodness, uses even evils which happen for the benefit, either individual or general, of themselves or others, and suitably provides for each being… as Providence is conservative of the nature of each, it provides for the free, as free.
— The Divine Names, ch. 4, §XXXIII, source.4 The privation thesis answers what evil is; providence answers why it is permitted. Because evil has no independent standing, it cannot break the order of a good God who governs all — and who turns even evils to good without coercing the free creature, “providing for the free, as free.” The two moves together — evil as nothing, providence as all-embracing — are exactly the frame Boethius will render into Latin verse a generation later, and Aquinas will systematize.