Dates: the early-modern to contemporary turn, from David Hume’s Dialogues concerning
Natural Religion (1779) through the twentieth- and twenty-first-century analytic debate · representative
works: J. L. Mackie (1955), John Hick (1966), Alvin Plantinga (1974), William Rowe (1979), Stephen Wykstra
(1984), Marilyn McCord Adams (1989), Eleonore Stump (2010) ·
Hume at Project Gutenberg
Summary: After Leibniz the initiative passes to the critics, and the
problem of evil is reforged as the standing objection to belief in God. Hume, in the Dialogues (1779),
revives the Epicurean trilemma in its sharpest modern form and makes it the central difficulty for natural theology.
In the twentieth century the debate splits into two problems. The logical problem (J. L. Mackie,
1955) charges that God and evil are flatly contradictory; Alvin Plantinga’s free-will
defense (1974) is widely judged to have answered it, showing the triad is at least consistent. Attention then
shifts to the evidential problem (William Rowe, 1979), which grants consistency but argues that the
amount and apparent pointlessness of suffering — Rowe’s fawn dying unseen in a forest
fire — make God’s non-existence probable; the reply of skeptical theism
(Wykstra, Bergmann) denies we are in a position to judge that such suffering is truly pointless. Alongside the
defenses run the constructive theodicies — John Hick’s Irenaean
“soul-making” (1966) chief among them — and a later
person-centred turn (Marilyn McCord Adams, 1989; Eleonore Stump, 2010) that faults the earlier answers for
justifying a person’s suffering by goods enjoyed elsewhere and insists the good must accrue to the sufferer herself.
And a protest strand,
sharpened by the Holocaust, refuses the whole project: some, with Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, would rather
“return the ticket” than justify a world bought at the price of innocent suffering. This survey records
who said what; the positions themselves are weighed on this doctrine’s argument pages.
Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?
— David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Part X (the sceptic Philo speaking).1 This is the ancient dilemma that Lactantius had transmitted (and answered) fifteen centuries earlier, now turned from a puzzle the theist resolves into the decisive objection against natural religion. Hume does not merely restate it: through Philo he presses that the mixed world we observe gives us no ground to infer a wholly good and omnipotent author — at best a cause “indifferent” to good and evil. The trilemma becomes the modern problem’s canonical opening.
In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false.
— J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence” (1955).2 Mackie gives the objection its hardest twentieth-century form: not that evil makes God unlikely, but that the theist’s own beliefs are logically inconsistent — that no possible reason could reconcile an omnipotent, wholly good God with any evil at all. Answer this and the theist is not merely probable but rationally in the clear; fail and belief is incoherent. The gauntlet set the agenda for the decades that followed.
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all… To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so.
— Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (1974).3 Plantinga’s reply is a defense, not a theodicy: it need not give God’s actual reason, only show that a good, omnipotent God could have a sufficient one — which is all that is needed to break Mackie’s alleged contradiction. If genuine freedom is a great good and even omnipotence cannot make a creature freely choose only the good, then a world with free creatures who sometimes sin may be better than any sinless world of automata, and God is not impugned for permitting the evil freedom makes possible. This is the ancient free-will answer of Irenaeus and Basil given rigorous modal form; it is now widely held to have settled the logical problem — even Mackie’s successors largely conceded consistency — and to have shifted the argument onto evidential ground.
Rather, this world must be a place of soul-making. And its value is to be judged, not primarily by the quantity of pleasure and pain occurring in it at any particular moment, but by its fitness for its primary purpose, the purpose of soul-making.
— John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966).4 Where Plantinga only defends consistency, Hick offers a positive theodicy, and names it after the father who first gave it: the Irenaean, over against the Augustinian. Humanity is not a perfection that fell but an immature creature made to grow, through a world of real hardship, from innocence into the earned likeness of God. A frictionless paradise would produce no courage, compassion, or faith; the “vale of soul-making” (Hick borrows the phrase from a letter of the poet John Keats) is the environment such growth requires. It is the soul-making answer of Irenaeus and the greater-good answer of Lactantius — a painless world would be a virtueless one — carried into the modern debate as the leading rival to the free-will defense and often paired with it. Hick pushes it, more controversially, to a universalist completion — soul-making must continue beyond death until all are perfected, or God’s purpose would be defeated — a move weighed, with the theodicy’s defeaters (distribution, horrendous evils, instrumentalization), on the soul-making argument page.
Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn’s intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn’s suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse.
— William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” (1979).5 Rowe concedes what Plantinga proved — that God and evil are not contradictory — and mounts a different case: that the sheer quantity of apparently gratuitous suffering makes atheism the more reasonable belief. His formal premise is that “there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.”6 The fawn — suffering unseen, benefiting no one, teaching no one — is chosen precisely to escape every soul-making or free-will answer: no human freedom is exercised, no soul is schooled. If even one such evil is truly pointless, Rowe argues, the traditional God does not exist. This is the problem’s living form in contemporary philosophy.
The standard rejoinder to Rowe grants his logic but denies his key premise the support it needs. Stephen Wykstra argued (1984) that the move from “we can see no justifying good” to “there is none” is licensed only if we could reasonably expect to see God’s reasons were there any — and, given the gulf between infinite and finite minds, we have no such expectation. His “CORNEA” principle holds that one may infer “it appears there is no X” to “there is no X” only where, if there were an X, it would likely be within our ken.7 On this skeptical theism — developed also by Michael Bergmann, William Alston, and others — our failure to spot a God-justifying reason for the fawn’s agony is exactly what we should expect whether or not one exists, so it is no evidence against God. It is the modern, epistemological form of the fathers’ appeal to providence we cannot survey: God’s reasons may be real and simply beyond us. The cost, critics note, is a scepticism that may cut wider than its users intend.
evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to one on the whole.
— Marilyn McCord Adams, defining horrendous evils (1989).8 A distinct late-modern line faults the whole preceding debate for staying abstract and third-personal — trading God against “evil” in general, and justifying an evil by a good enjoyed by the world, by others, or by a completed cosmos. Adams insists the worst evils pose a concrete, first-personal problem: how can God be good to the very person who participates in a horror, so that her life is still a great good to her? Generic, “religion-neutral” goods, she argues, are the wrong size to defeat such evils (in Roderick Chisholm’s sense, as opposed to merely balancing them off); only an incommensurate good — beatific intimacy with God — can. Eleonore Stump, in Wandering in Darkness (2010), builds the most fully worked-out positive theodicy to meet that demand, reconstructing Aquinas: God permits an adult’s suffering when it is the best available means to that same person’s own greatest good, union of love with God — a case she defends not by abstract proof but by close reading of the narratives of Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany.
God is justified in allowing human beings to endure suffering such as that experienced by Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary in the stories, because, through their suffering and only by its means, God gives to each of the protagonists something that these sufferers are willing to trade their suffering to receive, once they understand the nature of what they are being given.
— Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness.9 Both are weighed as the person-centred pair on the argument pages Horrendous evils and the goodness of God (Adams — plausible) and Stump’s narrative theodicy (contested); Adams’s critique also appears as the sharpest defeater on the soul-making page.
A final voice refuses the whole enterprise of theodicy. Its classic literary form is Ivan Karamazov, who — heaping up the tortures of children — will not accept even a final harmony bought at that price: “It’s not God that I don’t accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return Him the ticket.”10 After Auschwitz the protest hardened into theology. Richard Rubenstein’s After Auschwitz (1966) held that the death camps had made the old God of history unbelievable; John K. Roth’s “theodicy of protest” (1981) accuses God rather than acquits Him, holding the complaint of Job open; and Elie Wiesel’s Night and his Trial of God dramatize a faith that arraigns heaven and receives silence.11 These are not answers but a standing refusal of answers — a witness, worth recording honestly on any timeline of the problem, that for some the problem of evil is not solved but survived. Whether that refusal is itself a coherent and defensible theological stance — and whether the philosophers’ anti-theodicy (Surin, Tilley, Phillips) is right that the theodical enterprise is morally corrupt — is weighed on the argument page Protest and anti-theodicy.
This page closes the timeline the way modern surveys close others: it lays out the positions clearly and fairly and leaves the adjudicating to the rated argument pages. In brief, the modern debate supplies:
David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779), Part X (Philo restating Epicurus) ↩
J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 200–212, at 200 ↩
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York: Harper & Row, 1974; repr. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), p. 30. The parallel formal statement is in his The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 166–167. Summary and quotation cross-checked at Wikipedia, “Alvin Plantinga’s free-will defense.” ↩
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1966; rev. ed. 1977), Part IV, ch. “The ‘Vale of Soul-Making’ Theodicy” (borrowable at archive.org). The phrase “vale of Soul-making” is from John Keats’s letter to George and Georgiana Keats (spring 1819), which Hick quotes. ↩
William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335–341, at 337 (the fawn) ↩
Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” p. 336 (premise 1 of the evidential argument) ↩
Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 73–93 (the CORNEA principle, “Condition On ReasoNable Epistemic Access”). For the position and its defenders (Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, William Alston, Daniel Howard-Snyder), see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Skeptical Theism.” ↩
Marilyn McCord Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 63 (1989): 297–310 (the definition of “horrendous evils”; the beatific-vision cure), expanded in Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 26 and chs. 1–3 ↩
Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), p. 375 (Oxford University Press); quoted and discussed in Paul Draper’s review, “Wandering in Darkness,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2011) ↩
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880), Book V, ch. 4 (“Rebellion”), trans. Constance Garnett ↩
Richard L. Rubenstein, After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966; 2nd ed., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); John K. Roth, “A Theodicy of Protest,” in Stephen T. Davis, ed., Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981; expanded ed. 2001), PhilPapers; Elie Wiesel, Night (French La Nuit, 1958; Eng. trans. 1960) and The Trial of God (New York: Schocken, 1979). ↩