Type: supporting argument (off-timeline) · Assessment: contested — the conditional reading (God elects those He foresees will believe and persevere) is coherent, has the prima facie sequence of Romans 8:29 behind it, and is the settled teaching of a whole apostolic communion (the Christian East) as well as of a major living Western tradition (the Arminian–Wesleyan family); against it stand the “not of works… not of him that willeth” logic of Romans 9, the “gift of faith” texts (1 Cor 4:7; Eph 2:8), and a striking cross-confessional convergence — Augustine, Aquinas, and the Canons of Dort all deny that election rests on foreseen merit. Strong by one tradition’s lights, condemned or denied by another’s, with no consensus winner. · advanced by the Remonstrants (1610) and the Arminian tradition, with the Greek Fathers (Chrysostom, John of Damascus) reading election as following foreknowledge · against: Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and the Synod of Dort
Related arguments: the eternal decree — see also Double predestination — is there a positive decree of reprobation?, the companion argument. This page weighs the ground of the decree of election (is it conditioned on foreseen faith?); that one weighs the symmetry of the decree of reprobation. Both turn on Romans 9:11 — the children “not yet born, neither having done any good or evil.”
That God, by an eternal and unchangeable purpose in Jesus Christ his Son, before the foundation of the world, hath determined, out of the fallen, sinful race of men, to save in Christ… those who, through the grace of the Holy Ghost, shall believe on this his Son Jesus, and shall persevere in this faith and obedience of faith, through this grace, even to the end.
— The Remonstrance of 1610, Article 1.1 The advocated interpretation: election is conditional, resting post praevisa merita — “after foreseen merits.” God, foreseeing from eternity who will (by the enabling grace of the Spirit) freely believe and persevere, elects those persons to salvation; foreseen faith is the ground on which the decree of election lights, not its consequence. The rival reading is unconditional election ante praevisa merita — “before foreseen merits” — on which election is the cause of faith, faith the effect of election, and God’s choice rests on nothing in the creature at all. The distinction is narrow but decisive: both sides confess that saving faith is a work of grace; they divide over whether the divine choice of persons is grounded in the faith God foresees or is itself the source of that faith.
The classic Western statement is the first of the five articles the Remonstrants laid before the States of Holland in 1610, systematizing Jacobus Arminius’s teaching against the high Calvinism of his day. It is not a denial of grace: the Remonstrance is careful to make the foreseen faith itself a fruit of the Spirit’s prevenient grace, so the human contribution reduces to the free non-resistance or perseverance God foresees, not to an unaided work. The same instinct — that predestination follows God’s foreknowledge of the free response — is far older and far wider than the Dutch quarrel. It is the ordinary reading of the Greek Fathers: John Chrysostom, expounding Romans, ties the calling to those God foreknew would prove worthy, and John of Damascus makes it a formula — “God foreknows all things but does not predestinate them all… predestination is the work of the divine command based on foreknowledge” — a line the Christian East still confesses.2 Its scriptural engine is Romans 8:29 — “whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate” — read in its plain sequence: foreknowledge first, predestination after; and 1 Peter 1:2, “elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.”3
The order of the golden chain. This is the argument’s real strength, and it is textual, not speculative. In Romans 8:29–30 Paul sets down a sequence — foreknew → predestinated → called → justified → glorified — in which foreknowledge stands first, before predestination. Take proginōskō in its ordinary sense (“to know beforehand”), let its object be the persons-as-believing whom God sees down the corridor of time, and predestination reads naturally as God’s eternal resolve concerning those He foreknew would respond. 1 Peter 1:2 says the same in a phrase — the elect are chosen “according to the foreknowledge of God.” A reader who came to the texts without a system in hand would very likely read them this way, and for most of the Greek-speaking church that is how they were read.3
It is not a fringe reading, and it need not be Pelagian. The conditional reading is the standing teaching of the whole Christian East, framed by John of Damascus as a matter of preserving both God’s prescience and the reality of things “in our power”: God does not predetermine the free acts He foreknows, “for it is not His will that there should be wickedness nor does He choose to compel virtue.” Because the Remonstrant form keeps the foreseen faith itself grace-enabled, the position escapes the charge of making salvation begin in unaided nature — that is the separate, weaker initium fidei claim, which even the East refuses. Conditional election concedes that faith is worked by grace; it insists only that the choice of whom to save honours the free response God foresees rather than bypassing it. Its motive is serious: to keep God from being the author of the unbelief of the lost, and to make “God… will have all men to be saved” (1 Tim 2:4) a real and not a merely nominal will.
Romans 9 can be read corporately. The hardest text against the reading (below) admits a live alternative construal: that Paul’s Jacob-and-Esau, drawn from Genesis and Malachi, are peoples (Israel and Edom) chosen to historical roles in the plan of salvation, not two individuals sorted to heaven and hell. On that reading Romans 9 establishes God’s freedom in assigning vocations, and leaves the question of individual eternal election to be settled by the “golden chain” of chapter 8 — where foreknowledge comes first.
What holds. The prima facie sequence of Romans 8:29 is real, the corporate reading of Romans 9 is a serious and much-defended option, and the Eastern foreknowledge tradition is neither marginal nor heterodox. So this is not a case of a reading that “does not hold on its best case”; a major, ancient, and living portion of the church rests its whole doctrine of election here in good faith. That is why the verdict below is contested, not weak.
Where the reading is pressed hardest: the “not of works” logic of Romans 9. Paul does not merely narrate the choice of Jacob over Esau; he explains its purpose, and the explanation is aimed squarely at foreseen-merit conditioning. The children were chosen “being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth” — and he draws the moral: “So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.”4 Foreseen faith-and-perseverance is precisely a foreseen willing and running; to make election rest on it is to make it rest on the very thing Paul says it does not rest on. The corporate reading blunts this only partly: even if Jacob and Esau are nations, the principle Paul extracts — election “not of works… nor of him that willeth” — is stated as a general truth about how God’s electing purpose stands, and it tells against a purpose grounded in the elect’s foreseen response.
The “gift of faith” collapse. The reading’s deepest problem is internal. Even the Remonstrant form grants that the foreseen faith is itself a gift of the Spirit’s grace. But then, asks the counter-tradition, what does God foresee when He foresees the faith of the elect — if not His own gift? “What hast thou that thou didst not receive?” (1 Cor 4:7): if faith is received, it cannot be the creature’s own contribution laid down before grace as election’s condition. Election grounded on foreseen faith therefore threatens to collapse into election grounded on God’s foreseen gift — which is unconditional election under another name — unless the decisive, discriminating factor is relocated to something not given: the elect’s free non-resistance or perseverance that God merely foresees. And that residual is exactly the foreseen “willing and running” Romans 9 excludes, and the thing Ephesians 2:8–9 (“not of yourselves… not of works”) and Philippians 2:13 (God “worketh in you both to will and to do”) reach behind to attribute to God.5 Ephesians 1:4–5 sharpens the point: the elect are chosen “in him before the foundation of the world… according to the good pleasure of his will” — the ground named is God’s good pleasure, not the creature’s foreseen faith.5
The philology of proginōskō cuts both ways. The conditional reading needs “foreknew” to mean “foresaw the faith of.” But in biblical usage the verb “know” often carries the Hebraic sense of covenantal regard, not bare cognition — “you only have I known of all the families of the earth” (Amos 3:2); and Paul’s own reuse in Romans 11:2, “his people whom he foreknew,” plainly means “fore-loved,” not “whose faith he foresaw.” On that reading Romans 8:29 means “whom he fore-loved, he also predestinated” — the object of the foreknowing is persons, not their acts, and the ground of predestination is God’s prior love, not foreseen merit. This does not refute the prescience reading — both are grammatically available — but it dissolves the argument’s strongest single prop, since the “golden chain” no longer requires foreseen faith to make sense of the sequence.
The cross-confessional convergence. What is remarkable is how many otherwise-divided authorities deny foreseen merit as the ground of election. Augustine reached the unconditional reading against his own earlier view, insisting the elect are chosen “not because they were already believers… but that they may believe.” Thomas Aquinas, though he quotes John of Damascus with respect, concludes that “the foreknowledge of merits” is not the cause of predestination: since faith, grace, and perseverance are themselves effects of predestination, they cannot also be its cause, on pain of circularity — “whatever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination.” And the Synod of Dort made the denial confessional: election “was not founded upon foreseen faith and the obedience of faith… or any other good quality or disposition in man, as the prerequisite, cause, or condition on which it depended.”6 When the Bishop of Hippo, the Angelic Doctor, and a Reformed synod — parties who agreed on remarkably little — all converge against a reading, that reading carries a heavy burden. But the convergence is a Latin one; the Greek East never joined it, and holds the opposite to this day. The dispute is therefore not resolved so much as divided along the oldest fault line in the church.
Contested. Conditional election — that God chooses post praevisa merita, electing those He foresees will believe and persevere — has a genuine case: the plain sequence of Romans 8:29, the available corporate reading of Romans 9, and the settled witness of the Christian East and the Arminian tradition, all held without lapsing into Pelagianism. It is not weak. But neither is it sound, and its most vulnerable point is the sharp Remonstrant form: once the foreseen faith is granted to be God’s own gift (as the Remonstrance grants), election-on-foreseen-faith either collapses into unconditional election or relocates its discriminating ground to a foreseen free non-resistance that Romans 9’s “not of works… nor of him that willeth,” 1 Corinthians 4:7’s “what hast thou that thou didst not receive,” and Ephesians 1’s “good pleasure of his will” press hard against. Set beside that the cross-confessional weight of Augustine, Aquinas, and Dort against foreseen-merit election, and the reading is genuinely embattled — strong by the lights of Eastern and Arminian theology and the surface of the golden chain, blocked by the Pauline “not of works” logic, the gift-of-faith collapse, and the covenantal sense of proginōskō. Neither side has carried the field; the question is one the whole church has divided over since antiquity, and divides over still.
The Remonstrance of 1610, Article 1 (trans. Philip Schaff, Creeds of Christendom III), ed. Dennis Bratcher (CRI/Voice). The article grounds election in those who “through the grace of the Holy Ghost, shall believe… and shall persevere… even to the end” — the classic post praevisa merita formula. ↩
John of Damascus, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith II.30 (“Concerning Prescience and Predestination”): “we ought to understand that while God knows all things beforehand, yet He does not predetermine all things… predestination is the work of the divine command based on foreknowledge” (trans. NPNF, Series II, Vol. 9), at Wikisource. For the same instinct in exegesis see John Chrysostom, Homilies on Romans, Homily XV (on Rom. 8:28–30), trans. NPNF I.11. ↩
Romans 8:29–30 (“whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate… called… justified… glorified”) and 1 Peter 1:2 (“Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father”), KJV. ↩
Romans 9:11–16, KJV: the children “being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth”; “So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” The corporate (Israel/Edom) construal of the Jacob–Esau contrast is defended by, among others, N. T. Wright and James D. G. Dunn on Romans 9. ↩
1 Corinthians 4:7 (“what hast thou that thou didst not receive?”), Ephesians 2:8–9 (“by grace are ye saved through faith… not of yourselves… not of works”), Ephesians 1:4–5 (chosen “in him before the foundation of the world… according to the good pleasure of his will”), and Philippians 2:13 (God “worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure”), KJV. On 1 Cor 4:7 as the text that convinced him, see Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints I.7–8, and the Augustine detail page. ↩
Augustine of Hippo, On the Predestination of the Saints (I.34; the elect chosen “that they may believe”), c. 428/429; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.23, a.5 (“Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?” — No; “whatever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination,” obj. 2 quoting John of Damascus), trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, at newadvent.org; and the Canons of the Synod of Dort (1618–19), First Head of Doctrine, Articles 7 and 9 (election “not founded upon foreseen faith… as the prerequisite, cause, or condition on which it depended”). ↩