HistoricalChristian.Faith

Is the canon "discovered, not decided" — a fact of reality the church recognizes rather than constitutes, so the Fathers' use of the deuterocanon was honest error?

Type: methodological / theological argument (off-timeline) · Assessment: contested — as a theological account of the nature of canon, the "discovered-not-decided" (ontological) view is coherent and widely held: if inspiration is real, a book is God-breathed prior to and independent of any council, so the church recognizes canon rather than creating it. That much is genuinely disputed against models that make ecclesial reception constitutive, strong by its defenders' lights (Michael Kruger's self-authenticating model; F. F. Bruce's "canonicity follows authority"), and no side has a clean win. But the payload the proponent draws from it — that the Fathers who used the deuterocanon simply "included [it] mistakenly" — is not carried by the ontology. The principle is symmetrical: it tells you canonicity tracks inspiration, not which books are inspired, so a Catholic affirms the identical ontology and concludes the deuterocanon "always was" canon and the Hebrew-only lists were the mistaken ones. All the real work is done by the separate, evidential question of which books God gave — and declaring the deuterocanon-users the mistaken party assumes the very canon-boundary this doctrine shows was disputed for fifteen centuries · advanced by Mike Winger; the rigorous form is Michael Kruger's ontological model of canon

Related arguments: reading the patristic witness — see also does the Fathers' word "canon" mean the modern definition? (sound); what did the "ecclesiastical" (read-but-not-canonical) category mean? (sound); does quoting a book "as Scripture" prove a Father held it canonical? (plausible); did the early church build doctrine only on the undisputed books? (contested); did the early church accept the Apocrypha out of ignorance of Hebrew? (weak); did "not canonical" encode a substantive authority judgment, not a mere filing category? (contested); had the word "apocrypha" drifted to "inspired-but-hidden" by Trent? (weak); are the "twenty-two / twenty-four" book-counts alphabet-numerology, not canon boundaries? (weak).

See also: this is the theological premise beneath the whole list-versus-usage strain. Its defensive twin — that the church recognizes rather than derives the canon — is weighed on the sola scriptura and the canon-question page (contested); the historical dispute it tries to resolve is the "did the early church reject the deuterocanon?" argument (contested); and the terminological companions are does citing a book "as Scripture" prove it canonical? (plausible), what the "ecclesiastical" category meant (sound), and what the word "canon" (κανών) meant (sound).

Here the sub-claim is not a proof-text or a historical thesis but a claim about what kind of thing the canon is: a fixed fact grounded in God's act of inspiration, waiting to be found — not a decision the church takes. The interest is whether that account, true or not, does the polemical work it is put to: dismissing the documented patristic use of the disputed books as a correctable error.

The claim

Pressing the point in 20 Questions with Pastor Mike, the Protestant teacher Mike Winger states the ontological view of canon plainly and then applies it to the deuterocanon: "there is no such thing as scripture that is no longer canon… the canon is simply a fact of reality… God inspired these books, they are canon whether you acknowledge them or not," and so of 1–2 Maccabees, "I think they never were at any point part of it, and were included in some people's lists mistakenly."1 The structure of the argument is:

  1. Canonicity is a property a book has in virtue of being divinely inspired. Inspiration is God's act, complete at the writing; it does not wait on anyone's recognition.
  2. Therefore the canon is discovered, not decided: councils, lists, and churches recognize which books God gave; they do not make a book canonical, and a book God did not inspire never becomes canonical by being listed.
  3. Therefore the deuterocanon, if uninspired, never was canon — and the Fathers and councils who received it were not exercising a legitimate option but making an honest mistake, "including it in their lists mistakenly."

Premises (1) and (2) are the ontological account of canon, and they are strong. The weight of the argument, and the point in dispute, is the move to (3): whether the ontology licenses reading the patristic reception of the disputed books as simple error.

Who advances it

The proponent. Mike Winger presses the "fact of reality" form in his teaching on the Old Testament and the canon, deploying it directly against the patristic use this timeline documents.1 The rigorous form. The ontological view is not a popularizer's coinage; it is a mainstream evangelical account of canon, stated most carefully by Michael J. Kruger, who distinguishes three definitions of "canon" — the exclusive (the final closed list), the functional (books that operate as Scripture), and the ontological (the books God gave his church, whatever their reception at a given moment) — and locates the primary definition in the last: canon is a divine reality the church comes to recognize, not a human product. The same instinct is F. F. Bruce's dictum that "the writings are not authoritative because they are included in the list; they are in the list because their authority has been recognized… canonicity follows authority." So the metaphysics Winger states popularly has serious defenders and is held across a wide swathe of Protestant scholarship.2

What holds — the ontology of canon is defensible, and more widely shared than the polemic assumes

Take the account of the nature of canon on its own, apart from the deuterocanon application, and it is sound. If a book is God-breathed, its inspiration is prior to and independent of any council's judgment; no synod makes a book inspired by voting, and none un-inspires one by omitting it. Recognition is not constitution. On this the ontological model is not even a distinctively Protestant claim: Catholic dogma says the same at the level of metaphysics — the church "does not make" the canonical books but "receives and venerates" them as inspired because God is their author; Trent's decree receives the books "with an equal affection of piety," it does not confer their inspiration. So the bare principle "the church recognizes a fact it did not create" is common ground, not the point in dispute, and Winger is right that a merely sociological picture of canon — "the books the church happened to pick" — undersells what all sides claim is going on.3

Where it overreaches — the ontology is symmetrical, and settles nothing about which books

The overreach is the step to (3), and it fails at three joints.

  1. The principle is neutral between the canons; it cannot favor the shorter one. "Canonicity tracks inspiration, and the church recognizes rather than decides it" tells you that the canon is a fixed fact to be found; it does not tell you which books are the inspired ones. The identical ontology is available to the other side without modification: a Catholic affirms word for word that canon is a fact of reality God settled by inspiring the books, and concludes that the deuterocanon always was canon and that the Hebrew-only lists of Melito, Origen, and Jerome were the enumerations that "included [the matter] mistakenly." The ontological premise is symmetrical, so it does no work in the deuterocanon dispute at all — every ounce of the disagreement lives in the separate, evidential question of which books God actually gave. Winger's argument runs the neutral premise as though it delivered the shorter canon; it does not, and treating it as if it did smuggles the conclusion into a premise that is blind to it.4

  2. "Included mistakenly" declares a winner in a dispute the ontology leaves open. The whole of this doctrine documents not a clerical slip but a genuine, sustained division: a learned, Hebrew-conscious stream tiered the disputed books below a Hebrew-sized canon, while the wider church read them in worship and a strong Western and conciliar stream (the African councils, Augustine, Innocent I) received them among the Scriptures — and even the "excluders" quoted them as Scripture. The ontological principle can tell you that, since these two receptions conflict, somebody misjudged which books God gave; it cannot tell you who. Winger's "some people's lists" names the deuterocanon-users as the mistaken party — but that is precisely the canon-boundary in question, not something the "fact of reality" hands him. The move converts a fifteen-century contest into unilateral error by assuming his own canon is the fact against which the others erred.5

  3. It over-tidies the recognition it appeals to. Even granting the ontology, the church's discovery of the canon was in fact gradual, uneven, and contested — as this timeline shows list by list. The ontological model at its best concedes as much: Kruger grants that recognizing an ultimate authority involves an unavoidable epistemic circularity and that the historical reception was messy, and rests the case on the books' intrinsic qualities rather than on a clean, error-free discovery. Winger's popular form drops that concession, letting "it's just a fact of reality" flatten the real difficulty of recognizing the fact into a story where one side saw plainly and the other blundered. The ontology explains why the church could be right without inventing the canon; it does not underwrite the further claim that the recognition was so obvious that the opposing stream can only have been careless.2

Answering the proponent

Winger's metaphysics survives intact; only its deuterocanon application is touched. It remains true, and worth saying against a purely sociological account of canon, that inspiration is God's act and not a council's, so the church recognizes rather than manufactures the canon — the ontological point is sound, and shared even by the tradition Winger is arguing against. What does not follow is that the Fathers who used the disputed books "included them mistakenly." That verdict needs a premise the ontology cannot supply: that his canon is the inspired fact and theirs the error. Supply it, and the argument is no longer "the canon is discovered" but "the shorter canon is the true one" — the ordinary, evidential dispute this whole doctrine weighs, on the Septuagint, the lists, the councils, and the Fathers' usage, with no help from the ontology. So the honest scorecard keeps the two questions apart: Winger's account of what canon is is defensible; his use of it to dismiss the patristic reception is question-begging, and the flat "included mistakenly" is his overreach, not what the "fact of reality" establishes.

Assessment

Contested. As a theological account of the nature of canon, the "discovered-not-decided" (ontological) view is coherent and well-represented — Kruger's self-authenticating model and Bruce's "canonicity follows authority" are its careful forms, and its core claim that the church recognizes rather than constitutes the canon is granted even by Catholic dogma. Whether canonicity is best located in that ontological fact or partly in the church's constitutive reception is a genuine, unsettled debate between respectable models, strong by its defenders' lights and short of a decisive win — hence contested, not sound. But as an instrument in the deuterocanon dispute the principle is inert: it is symmetrical between the longer and shorter canons, so it settles nothing about which books God gave, and the polemical payload the proponent draws from it — that the Fathers "included the deuterocanon mistakenly" — is not carried by the ontology but presupposes the very canon-boundary this timeline shows was contested for fifteen centuries. The metaphysics is defensible and more widely shared than the polemic assumes; the deployment against the deuterocanon begs the question. Flag the "included mistakenly" verdict as the proponent's overreach — the ontology can say someone misjudged which books God gave; it cannot, by itself, say it was the deuterocanon's users.

Sources


  1. Mike Winger, on the Old Testament and the canon, 20 Questions with Pastor Mike (BibleThinker), at ~1:07:17: YouTube (jio72a9mIF0), from 1:07:17 — "there is no such thing as scripture that is no longer canon… the canon is simply a fact of reality… God inspired these books, they are canon whether you acknowledge them or not," and, of 1–2 Maccabees, "I think they never were at any point part of it, and were included in some people's lists mistakenly." The same session is cited on the apostles'-Bible argument for Winger's contention that Protestants use "the same Old Testament that Jesus used." ↩

  2. The rigorous ontological account, distinguishing the exclusive, functional, and ontological definitions of canon and locating the primary sense in the last, is Michael J. Kruger, Canon Revisited: Establishing the Origins and Authority of the New Testament Books (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012), ch. 1, and the "self-authenticating" model developed there (the church recognizes intrinsic "attributes of canonicity" — divine qualities, apostolic origin, corporate reception — rather than conferring them); see also his summary at "The Definition of Canon: Exclusive or Multi-Dimensional?" (Canon Fodder). Kruger grants the unavoidable epistemic circularity of authenticating any ultimate authority, so the ontological model does not claim an error-free discovery. F. F. Bruce's dictum, "the writings are not authoritative because they are included in the list; they are in the list because their authority has been recognized… Divine authority comes first: canonicity follows authority and is dependent upon it," is The Canon of Scripture (InterVarsity, 1988), ch. 1 (full text, PDF). ↩

  3. That the recognition-not-constitution principle is shared by Catholic teaching at the level of metaphysics: the First Vatican Council, Dei Filius ch. 2, holds the church regards the books as sacred and canonical "not because… afterwards approved by her authority… but because, having been written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they have God for their author" (papalencyclicals.net); the Council of Trent, Session 4 (1546), "receives and venerates" the enumerated books (trans. Waterworth, Hanover Historical Texts) — reception of an inspired fact, not the conferral of inspiration. The point that sola scriptura concerns Scripture's authority, recognized not derived, is developed on the sola-scriptura argument page (recognition versus derivation). ↩

  4. The symmetry point: the ontological premise ("canon tracks inspiration; the church recognizes it") is neutral between the longer and shorter canons, since it fixes only that canonicity follows a fact of inspiration, not which books carry it. The Hebrew-sized lists of Melito, Origen, and Jerome, and the deuterocanon-receiving stream of the African councils, Augustine, and Innocent I, are gathered on the timeline; which of them "recognized" and which "misjudged" the fact is exactly what the evidential dispute is about. ↩

  5. That the patristic reception was a genuine, sustained division rather than a correctable slip — a Hebrew-conscious minority tiering the disputed books below the canon while the wider church read and cited them and a Western conciliar stream received them outright, with even the "excluders" quoting them as Scripture — is the finding of the "did the early church reject the deuterocanon?" argument (contested), which the Eastern Synod of Jerusalem (1672) itself conceded: "not always have all of these been considered on the same level as the rest." The methodological premise that lists and usage are two partial witnesses to a graded standing is weighed on the citation-versus-canon page (plausible). ↩