Dates: c. 395 · Wikipedia
Summary: Gregory of Nyssa is the Greek East's answer to the question of when the soul
begins. In On the Making of Man he sets the two current opinions against each other — souls living
in a society of their own before they fall into bodies, and souls formed after the clay figure was moulded —
rejects both, and puts in their place a single beginning for soul and body together, on the model of a seed that
already contains the whole plant. What he does not do is settle where the soul comes from. The formula he
minted decided the timing and left the mechanism open, and that is how the East kept it.
He stands fourth on this timeline, and he is the first witness on it writing in Greek for a Greek church that had already had the argument once, in Origen's terms. The relevant chapters are xxviii and xxix of a treatise Gregory wrote to complete his brother Basil's unfinished work on the six days of creation.1
Gregory opens by naming the dispute as a live one and stating both sides without caricature. The first is pre-existence, and he describes it in the language of a settled society with its own moral order:
Some of those before our time who have dealt with the question of principles think it right to say that souls have a previous existence as a people in a society of their own, and that among them also there are standards of vice and of virtue, and that the soul there, which abides in goodness, remains without experience of conjunction with the body; but if it does depart from its communion with good, it falls down to this lower life, and so comes to be in a body.
— On the Making of Man, xxviii.1, source. Nobody is named. But “those … who have dealt with the question of principles” is as close to a citation as the chapter comes: it points at the treatise On First Principles, and the doctrine described — equality before the fall, descent by cooling from the good, embodiment as the consequence — is Origen's, in Origen's own order.2
The second opinion is the literalist reading of Genesis 2:7 — God made the clay figure first and breathed into it afterwards — and Gregory presses it to its conclusion in order to show what it costs:
Others, on the contrary, marking the order of the making of man as stated by Moses, say, that the soul is second to the body in order of time, since God first took dust from the earth and formed man, and then animated the being thus formed by His breath: and by this argument they prove that the flesh is more noble than the soul; that which was previously formed than that which was afterwards infused into it: for they say that the soul was made for the body, that the thing formed might not be without breath and motion.
— On the Making of Man, xxviii.1, source. The argument he is reporting is a good one on its own premises: what exists for the sake of something else is the lesser thing, as raiment is less than the body it clothes. Gregory does not answer the inference; he refuses the premise that gives it purchase, which is that either part came first at all.3
His case against the first opinion is not that it is impious but that it cannot stop. Once a soul can fall from a higher state into a body by wickedness, the same logic keeps working: the embodied life offers more occasions of sin, so the next descent is lower still, into the brute, then the insensible, then the inanimate, and finally into nothing — while the return journey the doctrine also requires would have to make the life of a bush better than the incorporeal state it fell from. Along the way he pauses to say what he thinks of the pagan metempsychosis-tales the doctrine keeps company with:
They tell us that one of their sages said that he, being one and the same person, was born a man, and afterwards assumed the form of a woman, and flew about with the birds, and grew as a bush, and obtained the life of an aquatic creature — and he who said these things of himself did not, so far as I can judge, go far from the truth: for such doctrines as this of saying that one soul passed through so many changes are really fitting for the chatter of frogs or jackdaws, or the stupidity of fishes, or the insensibility of trees.
— On the Making of Man, xxviii.3, source. The joke is that Pythagoras's alleged autobiography is a fair description of the argument. It is also, read strictly, an argument by association: Origen's fall of minds is not the transmigration of Empedocles, and Gregory himself has to work to derive the one from the other through several steps. The derivation is the substance; the jibe is the ornament.4
Having disposed of both, he states the middle position in the sentence that would outlive everything else in the chapter:
The doctrine of both, then, is equally to be rejected; but I think that we ought to direct our own doctrine in the way of truth between these theories.
— On the Making of Man, xxviii.8, source. The positive doctrine follows in the next chapter, and its argument is from the unity of the man rather than from any verse. A human being is one thing made of two; if the two have different starting-dates then the one thing is older than itself:
Nor again are we in our doctrine to begin by making up man like a clay figure, and to say that the soul came into being for the sake of this; for surely in that case the intellectual nature would be shown to be less precious than the clay figure. But as man is one, the being consisting of soul and body, we are to suppose that the beginning of his existence is one, common to both parts, so that he should not be found to be antecedent and posterior to himself, if the bodily element were first in point of time, and the other were a later addition.
— On the Making of Man, xxix.1, source. A second argument is added from the maker's side: a God who had to do the halves in turn would be “in some way imperfect, as not being completely sufficient for the whole task at once.”5
The image that carries the doctrine is agricultural, and it does two jobs at once — it explains how the soul can be present from the first without being visible, and it rules out any later arrival:
But just as we say that in wheat, or in any other grain, the whole form of the plant is potentially included — the leaves, the stalk, the joints, the grain, the beard — and do not say in our account of its nature that any of these things has pre-existence, or comes into being before the others, but that the power abiding in the seed is manifested in a certain natural order, not by any means that another nature is infused into it — in the same way we suppose the human germ to possess the potentiality of its nature, sown with it at the first start of its existence, and that it is unfolded and manifested by a natural sequence as it proceeds to its perfect state … so that it is not true to say either that the soul exists before the body, or that the body exists without the soul, but that there is one beginning of both.
— On the Making of Man, xxix.3, source. The clause worth pausing on is “not by any means that another nature is infused into it.” In context it answers the body-first opinion; but a reader coming to it from the later Latin argument will notice that it also excludes, in terms, the picture of a soul made elsewhere and put into a formed body. Gregory develops the point in the same chapter: the powers of the soul are there from the beginning and grow with the instrument, nutrition first, then sensibility, then reason “like a fruit” — not because a new thing has arrived, but because the recipient has grown large enough to show what was in it.6
Then comes the argument that most resembles the Latin traducians', and it is the reason Gregory is sometimes filed with them:
For since it is not from a dead body that the potentiality for conception is secreted, but from one which is animate and alive, we hence affirm that it is reasonable that we should not suppose that what is sent forth from a living body to be the occasion of life is itself dead and inanimate; for in the flesh that which is inanimate is surely dead; and the condition of death arises by the withdrawal of the soul. Would not one therefore in this case be asserting that withdrawal is antecedent to possession — if, that is, he should maintain that the inanimate state which is the condition of death is antecedent to the soul?
— On the Making of Man, xxix.5, source. He backs it with an empirical test — what is warm and in motion is alive, what is chill and motionless is dead, and the thing in question is warm and operative — and with a second horticultural case: kernels and torn-off roots put into the ground are “not deprived by death of the vital power which naturally resides in them,” and the earth does not implant that power from outside but only feeds it, “for surely then even dead wood would proceed to growth.”7
The structure of that last argument is Tertullian's. Both men reason from a living seed to a living product, both refuse to let soul and body come apart in time, and both make simultaneity at conception the load-bearing claim. Two differences matter, and they are the whole difference between a formula the East could keep and a theory the West would condemn.
The first is that Gregory draws no conclusion about the soul's source. Tertullian's living seed carries a shoot of Adam's soul, so that the race is one stock; Gregory's living seed carries a potentiality that unfolds, and he never says whose soul it is a portion of, or that it is a portion of anyone's. His own framing of where the whole thing comes from is not a doctrine of transmission at all but of the divine foreknowledge in which “all the fullness of human nature had pre-existence” — a claim about the race as God foresees it, not about what passes from parent to child. So the question the Latins were arguing about is not answered here; it is not asked.8
The second is that nothing in Gregory requires a bodily soul. Tertullian bought his transmission at the price of a soul with body, form, and dimension, because only such a thing can be carried in a seed. Gregory's seed does not carry a soul; it carries a power that is manifested in order, and the analogy that governs the whole account is between an unformed embryo and an unformed plant, both of which contain their futures without containing them as parts laid out in advance. That is why the simultaneity survived the theory that first produced it: it could be detached from the materialism.
The detachment was not obvious to everyone. The standard modern reference account lists Gregory — with Macarius, Rufinus, and Nemesius — among those who “seem to prefer” the generationist side, while conceding that their views “are not always clear.” The concession is the right one. What can be said firmly is that Gregory's premises point away from a soul infused into an already-formed body, and that he supplies no premise at all for a soul propagated from a parent's soul. A reader who wants him for either camp has to supply something he does not say.9
Three and a half centuries later John of Damascus compressed the chapter into a clause of the East's standard handbook — body and soul formed “at one and the same time, not first the one and then the other, as Origen so senselessly supposes” — keeping Gregory's timing and Gregory's named opponent, and, like Gregory, saying nothing about where souls come from.10
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man (De hominis opificio), NPNF² vol. 5 (dated there a.d. 379) — the prefatory letter to his brother Peter describes the work as completing what Basil left undone on the six days of creation. Life and dates: Gregory of Nyssa, Wikipedia. ↩
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man xxviii.1 — “some of those before our time who have dealt with the question of principles…” The doctrine described is set out at Origen, De Principiis II.viii.3 and II.ix.6–7: minds made equal, cooled from the divine warmth into souls, and placed in bodies proportioned to their fall. Gregory names no one; see Origen's page. ↩
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man xxviii.1 — the body-first opinion and its argument that “everything that is made for something else is surely less precious than that for which it is made,” illustrated from the gospel saying that the soul is more than meat and the body than raiment. The verse being read is Genesis 2:7. ↩
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man xxviii.3–7 — the sage who was man, woman, bird, bush, and fish; the descent through the brute and the insensible to the inanimate and “the non-existent”; and the reductio that the return journey would “prove that the life in a bush is more precious than an incorporeal state.” ↩
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man xxviii.8, xxix.1–2 — “the doctrine of both, then, is equally to be rejected”; the clay figure and the man “antecedent and posterior to himself”; the twofold nature “made up of the visible man and the hidden man” and the maker who would otherwise be “in some way imperfect … dividing the work, and busying itself with each of the halves in turn.” ↩
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man xxix.3–4, xxix.8 — the wheat-grain, the human germ possessing “the potentiality of its nature, sown with it at the first start of its existence,” the soul present though “not visibly recognized by any manifestations of activity,” and the sequence of growth, sensibility, and reason, the last “like a fruit, not appearing in its whole vigour all at once.” ↩
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man xxix.5–6, xxix.10–11 — the argument from the living body, the warmth-and-motion test (“the chill and motionless state in the case of bodies is nothing else than deadness”), the denial that what is implanted “was not a thing dead or inanimate in the laboratory of nature,” and the kernels and roots whose vital power the surrounding earth feeds but does not supply. ↩
The parallel Latin argument is Tertullian, A Treatise on the Soul, chs. 25, 27 — the two seeds “inseparable, and therefore contemporaneous and simultaneous in origin,” and the soul “derived from Adam as its root” (ch. 19); see Tertullian's page. Gregory's own account of the race's pre-existence is at On the Making of Man xxix.1: “in the power of God's foreknowledge … all the fullness of human nature had pre-existence.” ↩
C. Dubray, “Traducianism,” Catholic Encyclopedia (1912) — “Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Macarius, Rufinus, Nemesius, although their views on this point are not always clear, seem to prefer Generationism.” For the corporealist premise Gregory does not share, Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church III §154: “With Tertullian this theory was connected with a materializing view of the soul.” ↩
John of Damascus, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith II.12, “Concerning Man” (c. 743) — “body and soul were formed at one and the same time, not first the one and then the other, as Origen so senselessly supposes.” See his page. ↩