HistoricalChristian.Faith

Maximus the Confessor rebuilds Origen's system from within (c. 628)

Dates: c. 580 – 13 August 662; the Ambigua to John, in which the refutation of Origenism stands, written c. 628 · Wikipedia
Summary: The most serious answer Origen ever received came from a man who never named him. Some three-quarters of a century after the anathemas of 553, Maximus the Confessor took up the Origenist scheme of a primordial unity of minds that fell into bodies, stated it fairly and at length, and dismantled it not by citing the council but by argument — reversing the order of its terms so that coming-into-being precedes motion, showing that the Good cannot cloy, and then keeping the structure he had emptied: a pre-existence not of souls but of the logoi, the divine intentions of each creature fixed eternally in God. He answers the condemned system by rebuilding it on sound foundations, which is what a condemnation looks like when it is taken seriously rather than merely enforced. This is one block of the timeline of verdicts passed on Origen; Maximus also appears there as a witness to universal restoration, where his famous “honourable silence” is weighed.

The Origenist scheme, stated fairly

The occasion is a phrase of Gregory Nazianzen — that we are “a portion of God” who have “flowed down from above” (Oration 14.7) — which Maximus found being read in the condemned sense, as evidence for the pre-existence and fall of minds. Before touching it he sets out that reading in full, and more sympathetically than any of Origen's official accusers had troubled to do:

According to the opinion of these people, there once existed a unity of rational beings, by virtue of which we were connatural with God, in whom we had our remaining and abode. In addition to this they speak of a ‘movement’ that came about, as a result of which the rational beings were variously dispersed, prompting God to look toward the creation of this corporeal world, so that He could bind them in bodies as a punishment for their former sins.

This is the henad–satiety–fall scheme in exact miniature: a primordial unity (the henad), a movement away from it, and the body as a punishment — the very doctrine Justinian's first anathema and the first of the fifteen had condemned. Maximus grants his opponents the strongest form of their case and then refuses to answer it with an anathema.1

The despair argument

His first objection is not that the scheme is condemned but that it is unliveable. If a mind once satiated with contemplation could fall away from it, then nothing prevents the same thing happening again after any restoration, and again after that, for ever; a blessedness that can always be lost is no blessedness, and the scheme leaves the rational creature with no secure ground to stand on:

…it necessarily follows that rational beings, when found in the same circumstances, will undergo the same changes ad infinitum. For anyone who through experience is able even once to spurn something will find no reason to cease from doing so for all eternity. And if rational beings are to be swept about in this way, and are to be without any hope for an immovable foundation of stability in the Beautiful, what more pitiful condition of existence could there possibly be?

This is the same objection Augustine had pressed against the “ceaseless alternation of happiness and misery” two centuries earlier — that Origen's cycle robs the blessed of security — but Maximus turns it into the pivot of a whole reconstruction rather than a note in a heresy-catalogue.2

Reversing the triad: coming-into-being before motion

The decisive move is structural. The Origenist system runs rest → movement → becoming: a static primordial unity, a fall into motion, and bodily coming-into-being as the result. Maximus inverts it to becoming → movement → rest. Created things must first be before they can move; so motion is not a fall away from a prior perfection but the created nature's tending toward an end it has not yet reached, and rest lies at the end, not the beginning:

If, then, coming into being must necessarily be posited before beings can begin to move, it follows that motion is subsequent to the manifestation of being… It cannot be maintained that a movement of rational beings previously at rest in a primordial unity subsequently brought corporeal bodies into being.

One reversal of order defeats the entire scheme: if being precedes movement, there was no static unity for minds to fall from, and the corporeal world cannot be a prison built after a heavenly catastrophe. The same triad, so inverted, does the positive work later in the treatise — movement becomes the ascent of the whole human being, body and soul together, toward God.3

Satiety cannot touch the Good

The scheme's engine is satiety (koros): the minds grew sated with contemplation of God and so turned away. Maximus attacks the engine directly. Satiety is the quenching of an appetite, and an appetite is quenched only by something trivial or something repugnant — neither of which can be said of God, who is infinite and infinitely desirable and so, far from cloying, only deepens the longing of those who enjoy Him:

…satiety by definition is the quenching of appetite, and this happens either because appetite desired things that were trivial, or because it was repulsed and nauseated by things that were base and repugnant… It is obvious that neither of these can apply to God, who by nature is infinite and infinitely attractive, and who rather increases the appetites of those who enjoy Him owing to their participation in that which has no limit.

Here his patience with the opponents runs out: of those who make Gregory's “portion of God” teach a fall through satiety he says flatly that “their behavior is unethical and irreligious.” Even so, throughout the discussion the opponents are named only as “some people” and “certain individuals”; Origen himself is never named.4

The pre-existence he keeps: the logoi, not the minds

What makes Maximus's answer a reconstruction and not merely a refutation is that he keeps the shape of Origen's cosmos while denying its premise. In place of pre-existent minds he sets the pre-existence of the logoi — the divine intentions or predefining wills of each creature, “steadfastly fixed” in God from eternity while the creatures themselves are made in time. That single substitution lets Gregory's condemned phrase stand in an orthodox sense:

We are, then, and are called ‘portions of God’ because of the logoi of our being that exist eternally in God. Moreover, we are said to have ‘flowed down from above’ because we have failed to move in a manner consistent with the logos according to which we were created and which preexists in God.

The pre-existence is real, but it is God's, not the soul's: what “flowed down from above” is not a fallen mind but a life that failed to keep to its own eternal logos. The famous compression of the doctrine stands a few lines earlier — “the one Logos is many logoi and the many are One” — the one divine Word containing the defining principles of all things, and all of them gathered back into Him.5

Maximus is careful to root the doctrine in the tradition rather than in Origen. He assigns it to “Saint Dionysios the Areopagite,” who “teaches us that Scripture calls these logoi ‘predeterminations’ and ‘divine wills,’” and then to a still older Alexandrian authority — “the disciples of Pantainos (the teacher of the great Clement, who wrote the Stromateis),” who held it “the habit of Scripture to call them ‘divine wills.’”5 The point is pointed: the true Alexandrian inheritance, running from Pantaenus and Clement, is the doctrine of the logoi — not the pre-existence of minds that Origen's readers had built on it.

Ever-moving rest: the end unlike the beginning

Because Maximus has made the primordial state an endowment rather than a perfection, the end cannot simply repeat the beginning — the point on which the fifteenth of the anathemas most insisted (“that the end shall be the true measure of the beginning”). His name for the final state is the paradox ever-moving rest (stasis aeikinētos): a permanent condition that nonetheless includes eternal movement, the creature resting in God yet forever advancing into an infinity it can never exhaust. Rest and motion, held apart in the Origenist scheme as perfection and fall, are fused; and the fusion removes the danger of a second fall, since the movement is now only toward God and never away.6

On restoration itself Maximus keeps the reserve that gives his other page its title. In the Quaestiones et dubia he distinguishes three senses in which the church speaks of apokatastasis — the restoration of a person through the exercise of virtue in this life, the resurrection restoration of human nature to incorruption, and the restoration of the soul's fallen powers to their created state — endorsing the third (which he assigns to Gregory of Nyssa) while declining to commit the fuller doctrine to writing. The bearing on this timeline is that his eschatology is built to answer the same anathematized system from the inside: the natural will restored, the end better and more stable than the beginning, and salvation still not made automatic. His position as a witness to universal restoration — whether the reserve conceals a quiet universalism — is weighed on the apokatastasis timeline.6

Whom is he refuting?

A question hangs over the whole discussion: who were the Origenists Maximus argues against? Nicholas Constas, who edited and translated the Ambigua, judges that they were not a live seventh-century party but the ghost left by the condemnations themselves. Because the sixth-century documents “simply condemned Origenism without addressing the deeper conceptual issues,” Maximus “was impelled to dive down into the wreckage of Origen's system, in order to reconstruct it on sound philosophical and theological principles” — “overcoming the weaknesses of Origen's theology from within and preserving its essential truths for the Christian tradition.”7 On that reading the target is not so much Origen, or even his disciples, as Justinian's edicts: the anathemas had shut certain conclusions without answering the questions they were answers to, and Maximus set himself to answer them. That is why the block belongs on a timeline of the condemnation at all. Every earlier entry either enforced the sentence or resisted it; Maximus is the first reader to treat it as a philosophical problem — to accept that the conclusions are shut and then rebuild the system that had reached them on premises the church could keep.

Notes

Sources


  1. Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum 7.2 (PG 91:1069A–B), in Nicholas Constas (ed. and tr.), On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, vol. 1, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 28 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 76–77; the Greek and English of Ambiguum 7 in that edition are reproduced in full here. The phrase of Gregory under discussion is Oration 14.7 ↩

  2. Maximus, Ambiguum 7.4 (PG 91:1069C), Constas, p. 79; the companion form of the argument (that a good loved only for fear of its opposite is not the Beautiful) continues at 7.5 (1069D–1072A), p. 79 ↩

  3. Maximus, Ambiguum 7.6–7.7 (PG 91:1072A–D), Constas, pp. 81, 83. On the inversion of the Origenist triad — rest–movement–becoming replaced by becoming–movement–rest, so that the “remaining” is of the logoi and not of the intelligences — see Torstein Tollefsen, “Christocentric Cosmology,” in Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor (Oxford, 2015), pp. 314–316, following Polycarp Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism, Studia Anselmiana 36 (Rome, 1955), pp. 92–93 ↩

  4. “Their behavior is unethical and irreligious”: Ambiguum 7.29 (PG 91:1089A–D), Constas, pp. 114–117; the definition of satiety quoted above is from the same passage. Origen's name occurs nowhere in the discussion, whose opponents are only “some people” (7.2) and “certain individuals” (7.29) ↩

  5. Maximus, Ambiguum 7.19–20 (PG 91:1081A–C) on the logoi and “the one Logos is many logoi and the many are One,” and 7.24 (PG 91:1085A–B) on Dionysius the Areopagite and “the disciples of Pantainos (the teacher of the great Clement, who wrote the Stromateis),” Constas, pp. 99–103 and 107–108 ↩

  6. On “ever-moving rest” (stasis aeikinētos) and the three restorations, Andreas Andreopoulos, “Eschatology in Maximus the Confessor,” in The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 329–331, with the offprint here; the formula is at Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 and 65 (Carl Laga and Carlos Steel [eds.], Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca 7, 22 [Turnhout, 1980–90], 65.545–546), and the three restorations at Quaestiones et dubia 19 (Declerck, CCSG 10, p. 18). The reading of Maximus's reserve on restoration is treated more fully on the apokatastasis timeline ↩

  7. Constas, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers, DOML 28, introduction, pp. xiv–xvi (the judgement that the Origenism refuted comes “from the conciliar documents of the preceding century, especially the edicts of Justinian,” and that Maximus reconstructs the system “from within”). For the date of the Ambigua to John, Marek Jankowiak and Phil Booth, “A New Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor,” in The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 28–29 (no. 3, “early (before c.633/4), perhaps c.628”, the anti-Origenist theme at Amb. 7, 15 and 42 marking the early dating) ↩