HistoricalChristian.Faith

Was the pre-existence of souls an open question when Origen taught it — so that the anathema of 543 judges him by a later rule?

Type: supporting argument (off-timeline) · Assessment: contested — the historical half of the claim is very strong and is not seriously disputed: no pre-Nicene rule of faith addressed where a soul comes from, Origen said so in his own preface and no contemporary contradicted him on that point, and men of unquestioned standing were still declining to settle the question two centuries later — a priest at Rome in 400, a bishop consecrated in Ptolemais in 410, a bishop of Hippo writing in 415. The inference built on it is the contested part. “Not yet defined” is not the same as “not yet false”; the doctrine was argued against on scriptural grounds from Methodius onward, not merely legislated against later; and what 543 anathematized was not bare pre-existence but the composite of pre-existence, satiety, fall, and the body as a penal sentence — the part of Origen's proposal that his own century's readers were already refusing. See also the origin of the soul, where the three rival answers are traced as a belief in their own right; was Origen's subordination of the Son a pre-Nicene idiom?, the same anachronism claim pressed on the Trinitarian charge; and was Origen condemned by a standard that did not exist in his lifetime?, the umbrella fairness question this is one instance of.

Related arguments: the fall and restoration of the rational minds — see also Did Origen teach an endless succession of worlds? · Did Origen teach universal restoration as a doctrine?

The claim

The apostles delivered themselves with the utmost clearness on certain points which they believed to be necessary to every one… but on other subjects they merely stated the fact that things were so, keeping silence as to the manner or origin of their existence… Whether the soul be derived from the seed by a process of traducianism, so that the reason or substance of it may be considered as placed in the seminal particles of the body themselves, or whether it has any other beginning; and this beginning, itself, whether it be by birth or not, or whether bestowed upon the body from without or no, is not distinguished with sufficient clearness in the teaching of the Church.

— Origen, De Principiis, Preface 3 and 5 (c. 229), link.1 Three hundred and fourteen years later the first article of Justinian's edict to Menas anathematized “anyone [who] says or holds that the souls of human beings pre-exist, as previously minds and holy powers, but that they reached satiety with divine contemplation and turned to what is worse… and were made to descend into bodies as a punishment”;2 the first of the fifteen anathemas of 553 condemned “the fabulous pre-existence of souls” and “the monstrous restoration which follows from it.”3 The interpretation weighed here is the one that stands between those two texts: that Origen advanced pre-existence into a gap the Church had itself left open, that it remained an open question for generations after him, and that a sentence passed on it in the sixth century is therefore a rule applied backwards to a man who could not have broken it.

Who advances it

It is the standard historical framing of the case, and its earliest form is Origen's own. His defenders pressed it while the quarrel was live: Pamphilus answered the charges out of the accused's own book, and Rufinus, writing his Latin preface to Peri Archōn in 397, insisted that what he was translating was a work of inquiry rather than of definition. In modern scholarship the point is made routinely and without controversy. Henri Crouzel's Origène makes the exploratory character of Peri Archōn the organizing fact about the book, and treats the sixth-century propositions as a system read back onto it;4 Elizabeth Clark's The Origenist Controversy shows the charge-sheet itself being assembled — constructed in a fourth-century quarrel over ascetic practice and elite patronage, not inherited from a third-century verdict.5 The claim is also a staple of popular defences of Origen, where it is usually stated in a stronger form than the evidence carries; that stronger form is treated separately below.

The evidence for

Origen marks the question open, and no one of his own century says he was wrong to. The preface quoted above is a map of what the apostolic preaching had and had not settled, and the soul's origin is on the “not settled” side of it, together with the nature of the devil and his angels. Origen wrote that preface in Alexandria, under a bishop who would shortly depose him, and the deposition — on every surviving account — was for an irregular ordination, not for a doctrine. That is a separate question, weighed on its own page; what matters here is that the man best placed to contradict Origen's account of the rule of faith did not do so in any text that survives. Origen's hedging is not confined to the preface: when he reaches the matters that would later be anathematized he says explicitly that they are “treated by us with great solicitude and caution, in the manner rather of an investigation and discussion, than in that of fixed and certain decision”, having just noted that a reader full of preconceptions “may judge these to be heretical and opposed to the faith of the Church, yielding in so doing not so much to the convictions of reason as to the dogmatism of prejudice.”6

The earliest reaction is refutation, not anathema. Methodius of Olympus, writing around 300, went after the doctrine directly: Origen “said that the body was given to the soul as a fetter after the fall, and that previously it lived without a body”, and held that “the soul alone is man, as did Plato.” Methodius's answer is a philosophical dialogue — if the body was given as a fetter it must have been a fetter on evil or on good, and neither works; man is by nature neither soul without body nor body without soul — and in the middle of the attack he cites Origen approvingly on an etymology. He does not call Origen a heretic, does not invoke a canon, and asks no synod to act.7 That is the shape a disagreement takes when the disputed proposition has no defined answer behind it.

Men in good standing were still refusing to decide the question at the turn of the fifth century. Rufinus of Aquileia, clearing himself before Pope Anastasius I in 400 — that is, under interrogation, at Rome, on precisely the charge of Origenism — set out the three answers (soul infused with the seed, soul made new daily, soul made long ago and planted in a body, “the opinion of Origen”) and then declined all three: “I declare in the presence of God that, after reading each of these opinions, I am up to the present moment unable to hold any of them as certain and absolute.”8 A man defending his orthodoxy does not offer the pope a shrug on a settled article.

A man who professed pre-existence in writing was consecrated a bishop for it anyway. The sharpest datum is Synesius of Cyrene. Invited in 409 to the see of Ptolemais, he wrote an open letter listing the beliefs he would not give up and instructed his brother to make sure the patriarch's advisers saw it: “I can never persuade myself that the soul is of more recent origin than the body”; “never would I admit that the world and the parts which make it must perish”; the resurrection “is nothing for me but a sacred and mysterious allegory”. He added that he would keep silence in the pulpit if required but would not “preach dogmas in which I do not believe”, and left the decision to Alexandria.9 Seven months later he was consecrated — by Theophilus of Alexandria, the same patriarch who nine years earlier had convened the council that condemned Origen's books and had driven the Origenist monks out of Nitria. Three of the four positions Synesius reserved are among the propositions anathematized in 543 and 553. Whatever Theophilus's reasoning was — and it has been argued over ever since — the plain fact is that in 410 the leading anti-Origenist bishop in the world ordained a man who had told him in advance, in writing, that he held the pre-existence of the soul.10

Augustine still counted it among the undecided options in 415. Writing to Jerome on the origin of the soul, Augustine listed four accounts of “the manner of the soul's incarnation” — that all souls descend from Adam's; that a new soul is made for each person; “that souls already in existence somewhere are sent by divine act into the bodies”; or that they “glide into them of their own accord” — and said he had deliberately written so as to commit himself to none of them. Only a fifth opinion, that the soul is a part of God, did he set aside as heretical, and he set it aside by name: “Leaving, therefore, out of the question this heretical error, I desire to know which of the other four opinions we ought to choose.”11 The third and fourth of his four are pre-existence. In 415, in the Latin West, at the hands of its most careful theologian, the soul's pre-existence was an unresolved opinion and something else was the heresy.

Adversarial assessment

“Not yet defined” and “not yet false” are different claims, and the argument slides between them. Everything above establishes that the Church had issued no ruling on the soul's origin in 230, and had still issued none in 415. It does not establish that pre-existence was true then and became false in 543, which is incoherent, nor that it was permissible to teach and became impermissible, which is a claim about authority rather than about doctrine. On the Church's own account of what a definition does, an anathema declares what was always the case and does not create it; on that account, the interval before the definition bears on Origen's culpability and not at all on the proposition's truth. The historical claim and the exculpatory claim have to be argued separately, and the argument as usually stated runs them together.

The doctrine was resisted on scriptural grounds long before it was legislated against. Augustine is the decisive witness against the anachronism claim precisely because he is also its best witness. The same man who in 415 would not choose among four options had already written, in City of God XI.23, that “Origen is justly blamed for holding this opinion” — the opinion that souls sinned, “merited different degrees of debasement from heaven to earth, and diverse bodies as prison-houses”, and that this is why the world exists. His grounds are exegetical and philosophical, not juridical: Genesis says of each work that God saw it was good, which reads as a statement about why the world was made, not about how it was used as a penitentiary; and if bodies were graded to sins, the devil, who is worst, would have the grossest body rather than an ethereal one.12 Those arguments were available in the third century and were substantially made in it. A doctrine can be undefined and still be losing the argument, and this one was losing it for two hundred years before an emperor wrote it into a list.

Bare pre-existence and the pre-cosmic fall are not the same proposition, and the anathemas condemn the second. This is where the claim's scope is widest and its evidence thinnest. Augustine's four options include souls that pre-exist and are sent into bodies; they do not include souls that cooled from contemplation, fell by their own negligence, and were assigned bodies as graded punishments. Justinian's first anathema names the whole chain — pre-existence, satiety, turning to the worse, descent into bodies “as a punishment” — and 553 attaches to it the restoration that follows from it. The evidence that bare pre-existence stayed open is excellent; the evidence that the penal fall stayed open is much weaker, and the two most-cited witnesses do not supply it. Synesius asserts the soul's priority to the body and says nothing about a fall; Augustine leaves pre-existence undecided in the same years in which he blames Origen by name for the fall. Origen, for his part, did argue the fall, and argued it hard: the inequality of Jacob and Esau in the womb is explained by what each deserved “according to the deserts of his previous life”, which is not a question left hanging but a conclusion put to work.

The accusation was in circulation early, even if the sentence was not. Pamphilus's Apology, written from prison around 307–310, enumerates nine charges already being pressed against Origen, and one of them is that his account of the soul is erroneous, another that he teaches transmigration into animals.13 The charge-sheet is vaguer than the later one and lacks the pre-cosmic fall, but a martyr thought the soul charge worth a book of answers within sixty years of Origen's death. “Openly debated” is right; “without censure” is not, and the softer versions of this argument, which picture a tranquil third century first disturbed by Epiphanius, are describing a period that did not exist.

Origen's caution is real but is not a blanket. The preface's list of open questions is Origen's own map of the rule of faith, drawn by an interested party; it is evidence of what he thought the Church had left undetermined, not an independent record of what it had. And the caution is unevenly applied. Jerome's inventory of Peri Archōn, made from the Greek in 409–410 and hostile but reasonably close to the text where it can be checked, quotes flat assertions rather than hypotheses: rational creatures lapse into earthly bodies “due to their own negligence”; “these reasonings induce me to suppose that it is by their own free act that some are numbered with God's saints… and that it was through their own fault that others fell from holiness”; an archangel may become the devil and the devil be changed back into an archangel.14 A defence that rests entirely on “he was only asking” has to explain those.

One further complication, in the other direction. A live strand of modern scholarship argues that the system condemned in 543 and 553 is not Origen's at all but Evagrian and sixth-century Palestinian, so that the anathema misses its target for reasons that have nothing to do with dates. If that is right it strengthens Origen's case and weakens this argument, which concedes the attribution and disputes only the timing. It is a separate question and is not decided here.

Assessment

contested. The historical premise holds and is not seriously in dispute: there was no rule of faith on the soul's origin in Origen's day, he said so, no contemporary said otherwise, the first reaction to the doctrine was philosophical refutation rather than ecclesiastical sentence, and a Roman priest under interrogation in 400, a bishop consecrated in 410, and a bishop of Hippo writing in 415 all treated the question as unsettled. On that much the argument is as well-evidenced as anything on this timeline. Two things keep it from carrying the conclusion it is used to carry. First, the exculpatory inference does not follow from the historical premise: the absence of a definition tells against Origen's culpability, not against the proposition's falsity, and the doctrine was in fact being argued down on scriptural grounds — by Methodius around 300 and by Augustine in City of God — long before anyone legislated. Second, the claim's scope is overstated. Bare pre-existence demonstrably stayed open for two centuries; the pre-cosmic fall of satiated minds into penal bodies, which is what the anathemas actually name, did not enjoy the same latitude, and Origen advanced it with more confidence than the “investigation and discussion” framing admits. The reading that survives the counter-evidence is the narrower one: pre-existence was a permitted speculation when Origen took it up, and to read the anathema of 543 as the ratification of a third-century verdict is to misread the record — but the anathema was not a rule invented out of nothing three centuries late, and the man it names had done more than ask a question.

Sources


  1. Origen, De Principiis, Preface 3, 5 (ANF IV) ↩

  2. Justinian, edict to Menas (543), anathema 1, tr. Richard Price, The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553 (Liverpool, 2009) ↩

  3. The Anathemas against Origen, article 1 (NPNF2 XIV) ↩

  4. Henri Crouzel, Origène (Paris–Namur, 1985), ET Origen (San Francisco, 1989), on Peri Archōn as a work of inquiry ↩

  5. Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate (Princeton, 1992), esp. “The charges against Origenism” ↩

  6. Origen, De Principiis I.6.1 (ANF IV) ↩

  7. Methodius of Olympus, On the Resurrection (the Aglaophon), Part III.I–V, in Photius's epitome (ANF VI) ↩

  8. Rufinus of Aquileia, Apology to Anastasius 6 (NPNF2 III) ↩

  9. Synesius of Cyrene, Letter 105, to his brother Euoptius (409), tr. A. Fitzgerald ↩

  10. Kevin Wagner, “Theophilus of Alexandria and the Episcopal Ordination of Synesius of Cyrene”, Phronema 29.2 (2014) ↩

  11. Augustine, Letter 166.7 (On the Origin of the Soul, to Jerome, 415; NPNF1 I) ↩

  12. Augustine, City of God XI.23 (NPNF1 II) ↩

  13. Pamphilus of Caesarea, Apology for Origen 3–6, surviving in Rufinus's Latin; tr. Thomas P. Scheck, FOTC 120 (Washington, D.C., 2010) ↩

  14. Jerome, Letter 124.3, to Avitus (c. 409–410; NPNF2 VI) ↩