HistoricalChristian.Faith

Does Origen’s system require the devil’s final salvation?

Type: supporting argument (off-timeline) · Assessment: plausible — the inference is coherent and well-grounded, and probably right in its modest form. If every rational being fell from one original unity and all are to be recalled to it “so that God may be all in all,” the fallen being now called the devil cannot obviously be a permanent exception; Peri Archōn I.6 makes the restoration reach “even His enemies,” and III.6.5 keeps the God-made substance in being while destroying only its hostile will — the reconciliation of the creature under another name. Gregory of Nyssa drew the same conclusion. What keeps the claim short of sound is the word requires: Origen himself leaves the devil’s conversion an explicitly open question, denied that he taught it, and worried that a restored creature might fall again — so the system strongly tends toward the reconciliation of the fallen being without strictly compelling it. The rival reading, that the charge misrepresents him, is weighed on its own page.

Related arguments: the devil’s salvation — see also Did the devil’s-salvation charge misrepresent Origen? · Did Origen teach that Christ will be crucified again in the heavens to save the demons?

The claim

We think, indeed, that the goodness of God, through His Christ, may recall all His creatures to one end, even His enemies being conquered and subdued. For thus says holy Scripture, The Lord said to My Lord, Sit at My right hand, until I make Your enemies Your footstool.

— Origen, De Principiis I.6.1 (c. 229), link.1 The interpretation weighed here is the one both Origen’s accusers and a strand of modern scholarship draw from that premise: that the architecture of Peri Archōn — one original unity, a universal fall, a restoration in which the end answers to the beginning — makes the ultimate reconciliation of the being now called the devil not an optional extra but a consequence of the system, whatever Origen said in his own defence.

Who advances it

The oldest proponents are the prosecution. Jerome, summarizing Peri Archōn for Avitus, read the system as teaching “that men, or rather their souls, may become demons; and that demons in turn may be restored to the rank of angels,” and inferred from it the conclusion Origen would not state outright.2 The same inference stands behind Theophilus’s synodical charge of 400 and the ninth anathema of Justinian’s edict of 543. In a more careful modern form the reading is shared by scholars otherwise sympathetic to Origen — Henri Crouzel and Ilaria Ramelli among them — who hold that Origen did expect the eventual restoration of every rational creature, including the being that fell furthest, while insisting that “the devil” as a name for evil is destroyed rather than saved.3

The evidence for

The restoration is stated to reach the enemies. Origen does not confine the final recall to the comparatively good. The goodness of God “may recall all His creatures to one end, even His enemies being conquered and subdued” — and the chief of those enemies, on his own account of the fall, is the devil. The mechanism is symmetrical: “the end is always like the beginning… as there is one end to all things, so… there was one beginning,” and the many that sprang from that one are “recalled to one end, which is like the beginning.” The fallen are not written off: “those who have been removed from their primal state of blessedness have not been removed irrecoverably… they may recover themselves, and be restored to their condition of happiness.”4 A scheme in which the end mirrors a lost unity and no fallen order is beyond recovery has no natural room for a single being excepted forever.

“God all in all” leaves no permanent province outside. The keystone is 1 Corinthians 15:28, read at full strength. When the last enemy is destroyed, “all things shall be re-established in a state of unity, and … God shall be all in all.” And the destruction of that last enemy is expressly not annihilation: “not as if its substance, which was formed by God, is to perish, but because its mind and hostile will… are to be destroyed. Its destruction, therefore, will not be its non-existence, but its ceasing to be an enemy.”5 On this logic the being persists and its enmity does not — which is the reconciliation of the creature. Were the devil an eternal exception, standing outside the restored unity forever, God would be all in most, not all in all; the premise the whole eschatology is built on would fail at its hardest case.

A friendly reader drew the conclusion. Gregory of Nyssa, working from the same verse a century later, reached the reconciliation of the fallen spirits as a matter of course: when evil is at last annihilated, “even from those evil spirits shall rise in harmony the confession of Christ’s Lordship.”6 That an orthodox, uncondemned theologian took the restoration of the demons to follow from the premises Origen shared is evidence that the inference is native to the system, not merely forced on it by hostile readers.

Adversarial assessment

What holds. The modest form of the claim is well-supported: Origen’s eschatology genuinely tends toward the reconciliation of every fallen rational being, the devil included. The restoration is said to reach the enemies; the end is built to mirror a lost unity from which the devil fell; the destruction of the last enemy is defined as the removal of its enmity, not its being; and a sympathetic successor drew exactly the conclusion. As a reading of the system’s drift, it is stronger than Origen’s own guarded denials make it look.

“Requires” is a step too far. Origen does not present the devil’s restoration as an entailment; he presents it as an open question, and floats the opposite possibility in the same sentence: “whether any of these orders… will… be converted to righteousness… or whether persistent and inveterate wickedness may be changed by the power of habit into nature, is a result which you yourself, reader, may approve of.”7 That a will could harden “into nature” is a live alternative on his own page — and it is precisely the exception the “requires” reading rules out. The system makes the devil’s reconciliation possible and even fitting; it does not, in Origen’s own presentation, make it necessary.

The being restored is not “the devil saved,” and the difference matters. Origen protested that he never taught the salvation of “the father of wickedness,” and the protest is coherent with the system: what his scheme reconciles is the God-made substance once its hostile will is gone, whereas “the devil” — the will to evil, the enmity, death — is destroyed, not saved. Read strictly, then, the system requires the destruction of the devil and the restoration of the being; it does not require, and Origen denied, the salvation of the devil as devil. The accusers’ formula collapses that distinction, and the “requires” claim inherits the confusion unless it is stated with the same care Origen used.8

The restoration may not be final. A further difficulty tells against strict necessity. If a restored being retains the free will by which it first fell, it may fall again — the cyclical alternation of blessedness and misery that Augustine and Gennadius fastened on. Origen raises this as an objection to his own scheme rather than resolving it, so the system does not even guarantee that any restoration is permanent, let alone that the devil’s is compelled. (The strongest anti-devil formulations also depend partly on hostile Greek excerpts; but the decisive substance-versus-will passage stands in Rufinus’s Latin too, so the interpolation escape does little to blunt the reading here.)

Assessment

plausible. The interpretation is coherent, grounded in the primary text, and probably right in its measured form: Origen’s system does tend strongly toward the ultimate reconciliation of every fallen rational creature, the being called the devil among them. The restoration is said to reach “even His enemies”; the end is built to answer to a lost unity; the last enemy is destroyed by the removal of its enmity while its God-made substance persists; and Gregory of Nyssa drew the demons’ reconciliation from the same premises uncondemned. What holds the claim back from sound is the strength of the verb. Origen leaves the devil’s conversion an explicitly open question, offers the hardening of wickedness “into nature” as a live alternative, denied in writing that he taught Satan’s salvation, and never secures any restoration against a fresh fall. The system therefore invites and probably intends the reconciliation of the fallen being; it does not strictly require it, and the reconciled being is not “the devil saved” but the creature restored once the devil in it is destroyed — a distinction Origen kept and his accusers did not.

Sources


  1. Origen, De Principiis I.6.1 (ANF IV) ↩

  2. Jerome, Letter 124 to Avitus, §§3, 8 (NPNF2 VI) ↩

  3. Henri Crouzel, Origen (San Francisco, 1989); Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (Leiden, 2013), on the restoration of all rational creatures with “the devil” qua evil destroyed rather than saved ↩

  4. Origen, De Principiis I.6.1–2 (ANF IV) ↩

  5. Origen, De Principiis III.6.5–6 (ANF IV) ↩

  6. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection (NPNF2 V) ↩

  7. Origen, De Principiis I.6.3 (ANF IV) ↩

  8. Jerome, Apology against Rufinus II.18–19, quoting Origen’s letter (NPNF2 III) ↩