Type: supporting argument (off-timeline) · Assessment: contested — the reading weighed here is genuinely two-sided. Its core holds: Origen protested the charge in a surviving letter as a blasphemy “not even a madman can say,” his own Peri Archōn leaves the devil’s fate an open question and speaks of destroying the hostile will rather than saving the person of Satan, and the crude enforced forms of the charge — that “Christ will suffer again for the demons,” that he would “become a demon” to redeem them — are hostile inflations his accusers put on him, one of which Jerome himself conceded Origen “has not expressly said.” But the stronger form of the claim — that the restoration of the fallen being is no part of his teaching at all, only a slander or an interpolation — does not hold: the same system entails the reconciliation of every rational creature, Gregory of Nyssa drew exactly that conclusion without thinking it a misreading, and the interpolation escape is weak. The charge misstates the precise thing Origen said; it does not simply invent his drift.
Related arguments: the devil’s salvation — see also Does Origen’s system require the devil’s final salvation? · Did Origen teach that Christ will be crucified again in the heavens to save the demons?
…certain of these men who seek for matters of contention, ascribe to us and our teaching the blasphemy… namely, that the father of wickedness and perdition of those who shall be cast out of the kingdom of God can be saved; a thing which not even a madman can say.
— Origen, letter to friends at Alexandria, as translated by Jerome, Apology against Rufinus II.18, link.1 The interpretation this page weighs is the one Origen states in his own defence and his modern defenders repeat: that the charge condemned by Theophilus in 400 and by Justinian in 543 — that Origen taught the devil himself will finally be saved — misrepresents him; that his texts assert the destruction of death and of the diabolical will, not the salvation of the person of Satan; and that the charge is a hostile inference (or an interpolation) rather than his teaching.
The first witness for the defence is Origen himself. The letter Jerome preserves was written to protest a debate in which, Origen says, his opponent’s partisans falsified the record to make him teach the devil’s salvation; it is the same complaint of falsified works that Rufinus later built into a general interpolation thesis. In modern scholarship the reading is carried by Henri Crouzel and Brian Daley, who take Peri Archōn III.6.5 at its word — that what is “destroyed” in the last enemy is its hostile will, not the God-made substance — and so distinguish the annihilation of evil (and of “the devil” as a name for it) from the salvation of a person.2
Origen denied the charge in the sharpest possible terms. The letter does not hedge: to teach that the “father of wickedness… can be saved” is a blasphemy “which not even a madman can say.” Jerome, who quotes it in order to attack Rufinus and not to exonerate Origen, sets beside it the dialogue behind the quarrel: Candidus the Valentinian “asserts that the devil is of a nature wholly evil which can never be saved. Against this Origen rightly asserts that he is not of perishable substance, but that it is by his own will that he fell and can be saved. This Candidus falsely turns into a reproach against Origen, as if he had said that the diabolical nature could be saved.”3 The distinction Origen is defending is exact: against a heretic who held the devil evil by nature, he insisted the devil is not of an irredeemable substance but fell by free will — and it was that anti-Gnostic point, not a promise of Satan’s salvation, which his opponent twisted into the charge.
His own book leaves the devil’s fate open, and destroys the will, not the being. Where Peri Archōn reaches the question, Origen does not assert the devil’s salvation; he refers it to the reader as an open problem: “whether any of these orders who act under the government of the devil… will in a future world be converted to righteousness… or whether persistent and inveterate wickedness may be changed by the power of habit into nature, is a result which you yourself, reader, may approve of.”4 And when he describes the end, what is destroyed in “the last enemy… which is called death” is carefully limited: “not as if its substance, which was formed by God, is to perish, but because its mind and hostile will, which came not from God, but from itself, are to be destroyed. Its destruction, therefore, will not be its non-existence, but its ceasing to be an enemy, and (to be) death.”5 On the defence’s reading this is a doctrine of the abolition of evil, in which “the devil” — the name for a hostile will — ceases to exist, which is the opposite of Satan enthroned in heaven.
The enforced forms of the charge are inflations of what he wrote. The versions the councils condemned go well beyond Origen’s text. Theophilus’s synod of 400 reduced it to a slogan — “Christ suffered once for men; he will suffer again for the demons”6 — and Jerome, summarizing Peri Archōn for Avitus, pushed it further still, to the claim “that Christ will once more suffer in the sky for the salvation of demons” and even that, to redeem them, “He will become a demon.” But in the same breath Jerome concedes the crucial point: “although he has not expressly said it, it is yet implied in his words.”7 The prosecutor of the charge admits it is drawn by inference, not quotation — which is exactly the defence’s complaint.
What holds. The narrow claim is well-grounded. Origen really did protest the charge, in writing and in the strongest terms; his book really does leave the devil’s conversion an announced open question and describes the end as the destruction of a hostile will rather than the salvation of a person; and the forms actually legislated against — “suffer again for the demons,” “become a demon” — are compressions and extrapolations that even Jerome admitted Origen had not stated outright. To read the ninth anathema of 543 as the transcript of something Origen wrote is to mistake an inference for a citation.
What is overstated. The letter defends less than the defence needs. Candidus was a Valentinian, and the proposition Origen is denying is the Gnostic one — that the devil is of a substance so evil that his salvation would be the salvation of evil itself. Origen’s reply is that the devil is not evil by nature and so is not incapable of salvation; that is a statement about the devil’s nature, not a denial that his own system leads, at the end of all the ages, to the reconciliation of the being who fell. The two are not the same question, and the letter answers only the first.8
The “destroy the will, not the being” passage cuts both ways. III.6.5 rescues Origen from the charge that he expected evil to be crowned; it does not rescue him from the charge that he expected the fallen creature to be saved. If the substance “formed by God” persists while only its “mind and hostile will” are destroyed, then the being that had been the devil survives, shorn of its enmity — and a rational creature from which all evil has been removed, returned to “the final unity… when God shall be all in all,” is on any ordinary account a saved creature. Origen’s accusers collapsed “the devil is destroyed” and “the being is saved” into one charge; but in his system they are two descriptions of a single outcome, so the charge tracks a real feature of the teaching even where it garbles the wording.9
A reader Origen would have owned drew the conclusion he denied. Gregory of Nyssa, canonized and never condemned, read the same verses to the same end — that “even from those evil spirits shall rise in harmony the confession of Christ’s Lordship”10 — without supposing he was distorting Origen. If the reconciliation of the fallen spirits were a mere hostile fabrication, it is hard to explain a friendly and orthodox theologian reaching it independently from the same premises. And the last refuge of the defence, that the offending passages were interpolated, fails on its own terms: the substance-versus-will language of III.6.5 stands in Rufinus’s Latin no less than in the hostile Greek, and the sweeping interpolation thesis is weak.
contested. The charge in the form the councils enforced — that Origen positively taught the salvation of Satan, or that Christ will be crucified for the demons — does misrepresent him: he denied it explicitly, his book refers the devil’s conversion to the reader as an open question, and what he describes at the end is the destruction of a hostile will, not the enthronement of evil. To that extent the interpretation is sound, and the proponent who presses it is right against the slogans. But the stronger claim folded into it — that the restoration of the fallen being forms no part of Origen’s teaching, and survives only as slander or interpolation — goes too far. His system does drive toward the reconciliation of every rational creature; III.6.5 keeps the God-made substance in being while destroying only its enmity, which is the salvation of the creature under another name; Gregory of Nyssa drew the same conclusion uncondemned; and the interpolation escape is weak. The honest finding is the one Jerome half-admitted against himself: the charge is not what Origen “expressly said,” but it is implied in what he wrote — so it misstates his words while capturing his drift. The advocate’s over-claim — that the whole charge is a fabrication — is flagged on Rufinus’s page; the companion question, whether the system strictly requires the devil’s salvation, is weighed on its own page.
Jerome, Apology against Rufinus II.18, quoting Origen’s letter to his Alexandrian friends (NPNF2 III) ↩
Henri Crouzel, Origen (San Francisco, 1989); Brian E. Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology (Cambridge, 1991), on De Principiis III.6.5 as the destruction of the hostile will rather than the salvation of a person ↩
Theophilus of Alexandria, synodical letter (400), error 8, tr. Jerome, Letter 92 (NPNF2 VI) ↩
Jerome, Apology against Rufinus II.19, naming Candidus “the defender of the heresy of Valentinian” (NPNF2 III) ↩
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection (NPNF2 V) ↩