Dates: c. 397 (Confessions, c. 397–400) · Wikipedia
Summary: Augustine (354–430), bishop of Hippo, is the pivot at which the classical
ideal of friendship is corrected rather than merely baptized. In Book IV of his Confessions he
narrates the death of an unnamed boyhood friend and the grief that all but unmade him — and reads that
grief as a diagnosis: he had loved a mortal as if he would never die, pouring out his soul upon the
dust. From this he draws the central Christian correction of Cicero’s autonomous virtue-friendship:
friendship loved for its own sake becomes, when the friend is lost, an idolatry that tears the soul in two;
only friendship in God — where the friend is loved in the One who cannot be lost — is
secure. “Blessed be he who loveth Thee, and his friend in Thee.” This reorders the whole
inheritance around God as the third term of every friendship; his own letters, written across the miles to
men he sometimes had never met, enact the Christian friendship the Confessions theorizes.
But he was not then my friend, nor, indeed, afterwards, as true friendship is; for true it is not but in such as Thou bindest together, cleaving unto Thee by that love which is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us. But yet it was too sweet, being ripened by the fervour of similar studies… Thou removedst that man from this life when he had scarce completed one whole year of my friendship, sweet to me above all the sweetness of that my life.
— Confessions IV.4.7, source.1 Augustine plants his thesis in the very sentence that introduces the friend: however sweet, the bond of their shared studies — the classical friendship of like minds — was not friendship “as true friendship is,” because true friendship exists only in those whom God binds to one another by binding each to himself. The friend was a fellow Manichee, drawn by Augustine into “superstitious and pernicious fables”; the friendship lacked the third term, and so, on Augustine’s later reading, lacked the thing itself. Everything the chapter goes on to say about grief follows from that missing term.
For I was astonished that other mortals lived, since he whom I loved, as if he would never die, was dead; and I wondered still more that I, who was to him a second self, could live when he was dead. Well did one say of his friend, “Thou half of my soul,” for I felt that my soul and his soul were but one soul in two bodies; and, consequently, my life was a horror to me, because I would not live in half.
— Confessions IV.6.11, source.2 Here Augustine reaches for the very formulas of the classical ideal — the friend a “second self” (Cicero’s alter idem, Aristotle’s heteros autos), the “one soul in two bodies” of the old proverb — but turns them into an indictment. Precisely because he had made a mortal the whole of his soul, the mortal’s death left him only “half,” a living horror to himself. The classical praise-words are still true of what he felt; what has changed is the verdict on such a love when its object “must die.” (Augustine himself, in his later Retractations, looks back on the “one soul in two bodies” sentence as a “light declamation” whose logic he no longer defends — a mark of how far he had moved from the ideal he once inhabited.)
For whence had that former sorrow so easily penetrated to the quick, but that I had poured out my soul upon the dust, in loving one who must die as if he were never to die?
— Confessions IV.8.13, source.3 This is the sentence the whole page turns on. The grief was so total not because the love was too great but because it was misplaced — poured out “upon the dust,” spent wholly on a perishable thing as though it were imperishable. Augustine does not conclude that one should love friends less; the same chapter contains his warmest praise of friendship’s ordinary joys — “to discourse and jest with them; to indulge in an interchange of kindnesses; to read together pleasant books… these… were so much fuel to melt our souls together, and out of many to make but one.” The fault is not the loving but the terminus of the love.
Blessed be he who loveth Thee, and his friend in Thee, and his enemy for Thy sake. For he alone loses none dear to him to whom all are dear in Him who cannot be lost. And who is this but our God… None loseth Thee but he who leaveth Thee.
— Confessions IV.9.14, source.4 This is the reorientation itself, and the hinge of the whole timeline. Where Cicero grounded friendship in the two friends’ own virtue and left it exposed to the one loss no wealth could repair, Augustine adds the term that makes friendship un-loseable: God. To love a friend in God is to love him in the One “who cannot be lost,” so that death, which robbed the young Augustine of half his soul, can no longer take the friend away — “he alone loses none dear to him to whom all are dear in Him.” The same love now reaches even the enemy (“his enemy for Thy sake”), a range the classical ideal, reserving friendship for the few good, never had. Cicero’s autonomous virtue-friendship is not abolished but re-founded on a third party to it.
If souls please thee, let them be loved in God; for they also are mutable, but in Him are they firmly established, else would they pass, and pass away. In Him, then, let them be beloved; and draw unto Him along with thee as many souls as thou canst.
— Confessions IV.12.18, source.5 Augustine is careful to guard against the misreading that would take his correction for a counsel of detachment: the chapter is titled, in the old editions, “Love is not condemned, but love in God… is to be preferred.” Friends are still to be loved — and loved, if anything, more, since loving them in God means drawing them with oneself toward him. What is refused is only the love that rests in the mutable creature as its final good; that love “justly shall it be embittered… because whatsoever cometh from Him is unjustly loved if He be forsaken for it.” This is the seed of what later tradition would call the ordo amoris — loving each thing rightly by loving it in its right place under God.
O excellent man and excellent brother, there was a time when you were unknown to my mind… why then does a longing for your presence rack my inmost soul?… I grieve because I do not see you, and my grief itself comforts me… For if… I had come to know you as my brother and friend, and as one so eminent as a Christian, so noble as a man, how could you think that it would be no disappointment to me if I were not permitted to know your dwelling?
— Letter 27 (to Paulinus of Nola, a.d. 395), source.6 What the Confessions theorizes, the correspondence performs. Augustine writes to Paulinus of Nola a friend he has never laid eyes on, having come to know his “inner man” through a single letter “which flows with milk and honey” — and the bond is founded precisely on the third term: they are already “brother and friend” in Christ before they are acquaintances in the flesh. It is friendship in God made concrete: a love that binds two souls who share the same Lord even before they share a city, and that longs for the “heavenly Jerusalem” through the ache of the friend’s absence. The same warmth runs through his long friendship with Nebridius, whose questions and death fill the early letters and the ninth book of the Confessions.
Augustine of Hippo, Confessions IV.4.7, trans. J. G. Pilkington (NPNF, Series I, Vol. I). ↩
Augustine of Hippo, Confessions IV.6.11, trans. Pilkington. The “half of my soul” is Horace, Odes I.3; the “one soul in two bodies” echoes the classical friendship-proverb. ↩
Augustine of Hippo, Confessions IV.8.13, trans. Pilkington (the pleasures of friendship in the same section). ↩
Augustine of Hippo, Confessions IV.9.14, trans. Pilkington. ↩
Augustine of Hippo, Confessions IV.12.18, trans. Pilkington (chapter heading: “Love is Not Condemned, But Love in God… is to Be Preferred”). ↩
Augustine of Hippo, Letter 27 (to Paulinus of Nola), §§1–2, trans. J. G. Cunningham (NPNF, Series I, Vol. I). ↩