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Thomas Aquinas on eternal conscious torment

Dates: c. 1274 · Wikipedia
Summary: Aquinas gives the doctrine its scholastic architecture in the closing questions of the Summa Theologiae. He fixes the metaphysics on which endless punishment rests — the risen bodies of the damned are made incorruptible so they can be punished for ever, and passible so they can be tormented without being consumed — and marshals the reasons Divine justice inflicts an eternal penalty for temporal sin, including the classic infinite-offense argument. He rejects Origen's restoration by name, reads the “worm” of Mark 9:48 as the spiritual remorse of conscience while holding hell-fire to be corporeal, and traces the fixed, obstinate will of the lost. Throughout he takes over and systematizes the earlier Latin synthesis of Augustine and Gregory the Great.

The infinite-offense reasoning summarized below is weighed on its own argument page; this page presents and quotes Aquinas's teaching rather than re-adjudicating it.

Claims & evidence

The bodies of the damned rise incorruptible — so they can be punished for ever

Aquinas grounds the possibility of endless bodily punishment in the incorruptibility of the risen body of the damned. After the resurrection and the cessation of the heavens' movement no agent remains that could alter and so corrupt the body; and this, he says, serves Divine justice precisely by making the punishment perpetual:

Hence the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since living for ever they will be punished for ever.

— Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 86, a. 2.1 The premise is the same one Athenagoras, Tertullian, and Cyril of Jerusalem had already urged — a body fashioned to endure without perishing — here given its scholastic demonstration.

Passible but not consumed — burning without being destroyed

The other half of the mechanism is that these incorruptible bodies remain passible: the fire acts on them and torments them, yet, because it works “spiritually” rather than by consuming their matter, it does not destroy them. The fire, he writes, will “assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming them withal.”2 Against the objection that removing death is a mercy, he turns the point around: withdrawing death is itself part of the punishment, since it makes the suffering unending:

the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making them everlasting… wherefore they are said to be in “everlasting death.”

— Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 86, a. 2, ad 3. This is Augustine's “second death” in which the lost cannot die, given a physics.

Why the punishment is eternal: the reasons of Divine justice

In the question on God's justice toward the damned, Aquinas asks directly whether an eternal punishment is justly inflicted for a temporal sin, and answers with several converging reasons. The one most often cited is the infinite dignity of the God offended:

whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose commandments he breaks… But God's majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever.

— Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 99, a. 1, sed contra. Because a creature cannot bear a punishment infinite in its intensity, he reasons, the infinity is paid in duration: “since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least in duration.”3 He adds the reasons of the Fathers: that the sinner “despised eternal life” and so “is become worthy of eternal evil” (Augustine); and that a will fixed on sin would sin for ever — “from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever” — so that, in Gregory's words he quotes, it belongs to justice “that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin.”4 He also holds, against the annihilationist option, that God will not simply reduce the sinner to nothing: “privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin” (q. 99, a. 1, ad 6).

Against Origen: the punishment of neither demons nor men will end

Aquinas confronts and rejects the universalist hope by name. Origen, he notes with Augustine, “erred in maintaining that the demons will at length, through God's mercy, be delivered from their punishment,” an error the Church condemned as “contrary to the authority of Holy Writ” — citing Revelation 20:10, where the damned are “tormented day and night for ever and ever, which is the Scriptural expression for eternity.”5 Nor, he insists in the next article, are men better off than the fallen angels:

just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who die without charity, since “death is to men what their fall was to the angels.”

— Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 99, a. 3. He leans hardest on the parallel of Matthew 25:46, read “of the elect conjointly with the damned”: since “it is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end,” so too “it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end.”6

The pains of hell: corporeal fire, and the “worm” as the remorse of conscience

On the nature of the torments Aquinas is careful. The fire that torments the risen bodies is real, bodily fire: “the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bodily.”7 But the undying “worm” of Mark 9:48 he reads spiritually — not a bodily creature but the gnawing of an accusing conscience:

the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of a spiritual nature: and this is the remorse of conscience, which is called a worm because it originates from the corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of corruption torments by gnawing.

— Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 97, a. 2.8

The fixed will of the damned — and their wish not to be

The damnation is permanent because the will is permanently turned from God. The deliberate will of the lost, Aquinas says, “is in them always evil… because they are completely turned away from the last end of a right will”; they never truly repent, but only “indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.”9 In one striking concession he grants that the damned would, by sober reckoning, rather not exist at all than exist in misery — yet God keeps them in being:

“not to be” takes on the aspect of good, since “to lack an evil is a kind of good”… In this way it is better for the damned not to be than to be unhappy… In this sense the damned can prefer “not to be” according to their deliberate reason.

— Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 98, a. 3.10 That the lost would choose extinction if they could, but are denied it, is the sharpest form of the tradition's claim that immortality is not owned but imposed on the damned for punishment.

Notes

Sources


  1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 86, a. 2 (trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 86, a. 2. ↩

  2. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 86, a. 2, ad 3 (death withdrawn to make punishment everlasting) and a. 3, ad 2 (the fire “will assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming them withal”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 86, aa. 2–3. ↩

  3. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 99, a. 1 (“since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity… it must needs be infinite at least in duration”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 99, a. 1. ↩

  4. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 99, a. 1 (the reasons “given by the saints”: Augustine, “He is become worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal”; the will to remain in sin for ever; Gregory, that it belongs to justice “that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 99, a. 1. ↩

  5. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 99, a. 2 (Origen “erred in maintaining that the demons will at length… be delivered from their punishment”; Rev. 20:10, “tormented day and night for ever and ever, which is the Scriptural expression for eternity”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 99, a. 2. ↩

  6. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 99, a. 3 (“just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness… so too are the souls of men who die without charity”; on Matt. 25:46, “it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 99, a. 3. ↩

  7. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 97, a. 5 (“the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bodily”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 97, a. 5. ↩

  8. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 97, a. 2 (the worm as “the remorse of conscience”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 97, a. 2. ↩

  9. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 98, a. 1 (the deliberate will of the damned “is in them always evil… because they are completely turned away from the last end”) and a. 2 (they repent only “indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 98, aa. 1–2. ↩

  10. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, q. 98, a. 3 (“it is better for the damned not to be than to be unhappy… In this sense the damned can prefer ‘not to be’ according to their deliberate reason”): New Advent, Summa Suppl. q. 98, a. 3. ↩