Type: supporting argument (off-timeline) · Assessment: plausible — Mark’s second clause, “if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery” (Mark 10:12), makes the wife the active divorcing party, a case mainstream Jewish law of the period did not envisage but Roman and Greek law did — so the widely-held inference that Mark adapted Jesus’ saying for a Greco-Roman readership is coherent and well-supported. But the exclusive “Roman, not Jewish” form overreaches: elite Jewish women did initiate divorce (Josephus’ Herodian examples), the fifth-century Elephantine contracts gave wives that right, and the clause may even be dominical — aimed at the live Herodian scandal — rather than a Gentile-audience redaction · bears on the source question weighed under why Matthew alone carries the exception
See also: why does Matthew alone carry the exception clause? · is Jesus siding with Shammai against Hillel’s “any cause” divorce?
And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery.
— Mark 10:11–12. Alone among the four New Testament forms of the divorce saying, Mark gives a second, mirror clause in which the wife “puts away” (apolysasa) her husband. The advocated thesis is a claim about Mark’s composition and audience: because a wife initiating divorce was a live legal reality under Roman and Greek law but not under the Jewish law of Jesus’ setting, Mark has extended the saying to fit a Greco-Roman readership — evidence that his Gospel is aimed at Gentiles and part of why his form differs from Matthew’s Jewish-framed one. It is a thesis about the audience of Mark, kept distinct from the separate question of whether Matthew’s exception clause is original or redactional (weighed under why Matthew alone carries the exception).
The reading is close to standard in Markan commentary. R. T. France, in the New International Greek Testament Commentary, judges that the second, balancing clause — the wife who divorces her husband — may reflect an origin for Mark’s Gospel (or at least for this tradition) in Rome, where the law recognized a wife’s right of divorce that the Jewish world did not, and treats the notorious Herodias affair as the exception that proves the rule.1 Joseph Fitzmyer draws the same conclusion for the source question: “V. 12 is a further Marcan extension of the first logion, introduced to suit the contingencies of Gentile Christian communities in areas where Roman and Greek law prevailed and where a woman was permitted to divorce her husband,” and Donahue and Harrington report it as the general critical verdict that the clause “is generally regarded as an addition to Jesus’ teaching that was made to address situations related to the Roman legal practice whereby a woman could initiate divorce proceedings.”2 Adela Yarbro Collins, in the Hermeneia commentary, and a broad range of critical exegetes read v. 12 the same way. The observation is old: the ancient catenist Victor of Antioch already noticed that the wife-initiated case was unusual — the Lord here “forbids this, which was neither plain, nor known to all, though it was contrary to nature” — and Bede knew of wives who dismissed their husbands (“as many are read to have done for the sake of religion”), so the atypicality of a woman putting away her husband was felt by readers long before it was made an argument about Mark’s audience.3
The Jewish law of divorce was, as a rule, the husband’s prerogative. Under the ordinary halakhah descended from Deuteronomy 24:1, it is the man who “writes her a bill of divorcement”; the Mishnah’s tractate on divorce (Gittin) is framed throughout around a husband delivering the get, and a wife dissatisfied with her marriage could at most petition a court to compel her husband to divorce her — she could not simply divorce him herself. Josephus states the principle in his own voice, and treats a woman who breaks it as acting lawlessly: “with us it is lawful for a husband to do so; but a wife, if she departs from her husband, cannot of herself be married to another, unless her former husband put her away.”4 So the plain sense of Mark 10:12 — a wife who “puts away her husband” and remarries — describes an action that the standard Jewish law did not provide for.
Roman and Greek law did provide for it. In the classical Roman law of the late Republic and Principate, divorce was available to either spouse: a wife (or, where she was still under her father’s power, her paterfamilias) could dissolve the marriage by unilateral notice, exactly as a husband could. Wife-initiated divorce was commonplace in the Greco-Roman world Mark’s Gentile readers inhabited. A saying that pronounced only on a husband dismissing his wife would leave that everyday case untouched; Mark’s added clause closes the gap, applying Jesus’ principle symmetrically to the situation his readers actually met.5
Mark is on independent grounds a Gospel that explains Jewish things to Gentiles. The adaptation reading does not stand alone: Mark translates Aramaic phrases (talitha cumi, ephphatha, 7:34), glosses Jewish customs for outsiders (“the Pharisees… except they wash… holding the tradition of the elders,” 7:3–4), and renders the “two mites” into a Roman quadrans (12:42). A saying re-tooled to reach a reader who could herself initiate a divorce fits that whole editorial habit — which is why the clause is standardly cited as one small datum in the case that Mark writes for a Roman/Gentile audience.6
What holds. The core observation is secure and not seriously disputed: Mark 10:12 puts the wife in the active role of divorcer, a role the ordinary Jewish law of the get did not grant her but Roman and Greek law did, and Mark elsewhere plainly shapes his material for readers outside the Jewish law. So the inference that this clause reflects, and was framed for, a Greco-Roman setting is well-grounded — the strongest single textual sign that the divorce tradition was already being adapted to its hearers, and a real support for the abbreviation reading of the Synoptic difference (that Mark and Luke render for Gentiles what Matthew states in Jewish terms).
What is overstated or imprecise. Three cautions keep the thesis honest, and together they pull it back from the exclusive “Roman, not Jewish” form to a milder one. (1) Jewish women were not wholly barred from initiating divorce, so the clause does not require a non-Jewish setting. Josephus’ own narrative supplies elite counter-examples: Salome sent her husband Costobarus “a bill of divorce” on her own initiative, and Herodias “took upon her to confound the laws of our country, and divorced herself from her husband, while he was alive” — the very scandal for which Mark 6:17–18 has John the Baptist rebuke Antipas. Josephus brands both as lawless, so they confirm the rule even while showing the practice; but they show that wife-initiated divorce was a known Jewish reality, not a purely foreign one. Earlier still, the fifth-century-BC Jewish marriage contracts from Elephantine gave the wife an explicit, symmetrical right to declare divorce (the reciprocal “I hated…” clause, on payment of the same “silver of hatred” whether husband or wife initiated), and the reading of the second-century Judaean-desert papyrus P.Se’elim (XHev/Se) 13 as a woman’s bill of divorce — argued by Tal Ilan, contested by others — keeps the question genuinely open. Wife-initiated divorce among Jews was exceptional and often reckoned illegitimate, but it was not unknown.7 (2) The clause may be dominical, not a Gentile-audience redaction. Wife-initiated divorce in the Herodian house was headline news in Jesus’ own Galilee and Perea — Antipas married Herodias after she left her first husband, and the Baptist died over it (Mark 6:17–18) — so Jesus could himself have pronounced on a wife putting away her husband, addressing the notorious local case rather than a distant Roman one; and since Mark sets this whole dialogue in Perea, Antipas’ own tetrarchy “beyond Jordan” (Mark 10:1), the Herodian scandal is the near context. On that reading v. 12 is not evidence of Mark’s Gentile provenance at all, but a genuine word of Jesus condemning Herod and Herodias.8 (3) “Roman law” is a loose shorthand. What the clause presupposes is a legal culture in which a wife could initiate divorce; that was true of Roman and of Greek/Hellenistic law generally, and (in the Herodian orbit) of Romanized Jewish elites — so the sharp “Roman versus Jewish” antithesis is really “a milieu where wives divorce versus the ordinary halakhah,” a softer and more defensible contrast.
Plausible. That Mark 10:12 reflects a legal world in which a wife could initiate divorce — and that Mark, who elsewhere explains Jewish things to Gentiles, framed the clause for such readers — is a coherent, mainstream, and well-supported reading, and the best single textual sign that the divorce saying was adapted to its audience. What it does not sustain is the exclusive form, “Roman, not Jewish”: elite Jewish women (Salome, Herodias) demonstrably did initiate divorce, the Elephantine contracts granted the right outright, and the Se’elim papyrus keeps the documentary question live — so the clause reflects a milieu where wife-initiated divorce occurred rather than one that only Roman law could supply. And because that milieu reached into Jesus’ own Herodian setting, the clause need not be a Gentile-audience redaction at all: it may be a dominical word aimed at the Herodias affair. The narrow observation (a wife as active divorcer, at home in Greco-Roman law) is essentially certain; the advocated inference (proof that Mark redacted the saying for Gentiles) is probable but short of established, which is why it rates plausible rather than sound. It supports, but does not by itself prove, the abbreviation reading of why the Synoptic forms differ (weighed under why Matthew alone carries the exception).
R. T. France, The Gospel of Mark (New International Greek Testament Commentary; Eerdmans, 2002), 393, on Mark 10:12 — France judges that the balancing clause about the wife who divorces her husband may reflect an origin for Mark’s Gospel, or at least for this tradition, in Rome, where the law recognized a wife’s right of divorce that Jewish law did not, and treats the Herodias affair (his note on 6:17) as the exception proving the rule. (The commentary is in print and not open-access; the compressed line often quoted online — that the verse “envisages a wife divorcing her husband, which Jewish law does not envisage but Roman law does” — is a secondary paraphrase of this page, not France’s verbatim wording.) ↩
Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “The Matthean Divorce Texts and Some New Palestinian Evidence,” Theological Studies 37 (1976): 197–226, at 205 — “V. 12 is a further Marcan extension of the first logion, introduced to suit the contingencies of Gentile Christian communities in areas where Roman and Greek law prevailed and where a woman was permitted to divorce her husband.” The same redactional judgment is stated as the general critical verdict by John R. Donahue and Daniel J. Harrington, The Gospel of Mark (Sacra Pagina; Liturgical Press, 2002), 295: the clause “is generally regarded as an addition to Jesus’ teaching that was made to address situations related to the Roman legal practice whereby a woman could initiate divorce proceedings.” ↩
Victor of Antioch’s catena on Mark, as preserved in Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Mark 10 — on the wife-initiated case: “The law indeed forbade what was plainly adultery; but the Saviour forbids this, which was neither plain, nor known to all, though it was contrary to nature.” So too Bede, On the Gospel of Mark, who allows that a wife may dismiss a husband on the one carnal ground (fornication) or the spiritual ground (the fear of God), “as many are read to have done for the sake of religion” — both noticing the atypicality of a woman putting away her husband. Adela Yarbro Collins, Mark: A Commentary (Hermeneia; Fortress, 2007), on 10:11–12, reads v. 12 as reflecting a setting in which women could divorce their husbands (Greco-Roman law, and the Herodian precedents). ↩
Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews 15.259–260 (Whiston trans.) — of Salome, who, quarreling with Costobarus, “sent him a bill of divorce and dissolved her marriage with him, though this was not according to the Jewish laws; for with us it is lawful for a husband to do so; but a wife, if she departs from her husband, cannot of herself be married to another, unless her former husband put her away.” On the ordinary halakhah of the husband-delivered get and a wife’s recourse only to a court that could compel her husband to divorce, see the Mishnah tractates Gittin (9:8) and Ketubbot (7:9–10). ↩
On unilateral divorce by either spouse in classical Roman law see the standard treatments (e.g. Susan Treggiari, Roman Marriage [Oxford, 1991], ch. 13, on divorce by repudium available to wife as well as husband); the point is drawn on in Fitzmyer, “The Matthean Divorce Texts,” 205 and France, Mark, 393 (n. 1 above). ↩
On Mark’s explanatory glosses for Gentile readers — Aramaic translated (5:41; 7:34), Jewish washing customs explained (7:3–4), the widow’s “two mites” converted to the Roman quadrans (12:42) — see France, Mark, 20–35 (introduction, on Mark’s audience), with 10:12 taken as one datum among these. ↩
On elite Jewish women who did initiate divorce: Josephus, Antiquities 18.136 — Herodias “took upon her to confound the laws of our country, and divorced herself from her husband, while he was alive, and was married to Herod [Antipas], her husband’s brother” (the affair rebuked by John the Baptist, Mark 6:17–18) — and the Salome case at 15.259–260 (n. 4 above). On the fifth-century-BC Elephantine Aramaic “documents of wifehood,” whose reciprocal repudiation clause let either spouse dissolve the marriage by declaring “I hated…” on payment of the same fixed “silver of hatred,” see the standard editions (A. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. [Oxford, 1923], no. 15; E. G. Kraeling, The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri [1953], nos. 2, 7) and the discussion at “A Study of Documentary Sources,” Constellations 1.1 (2009). On the disputed second-century divorce document, see Tal Ilan, “Notes and Observations on a Newly Published Divorce Bill from the Judaean Desert,” Harvard Theological Review 89 (1996): 195–202 (arguing P.Se’elim/XHev/Se 13 is a woman’s bill of divorce), the reply of Adiel Schremer, HTR 91 (1998): 193–202 (defending the traditional view), and David Instone-Brewer, “Jewish Women Divorcing Their Husbands in Early Judaism: The Background to Papyrus Še’elim 13,” HTR 92 (1999): 349–357 (holding a wife’s divorce right, though not the rabbinic norm, a real contractual feature of some Jewish practice); cf. Bernadette J. Brooten, “Konnten Frauen im alten Judentum die Scheidung betreiben? Überlegungen zu Mk 10,11–12 und 1 Kor 7,10–11,” Evangelische Theologie 42 (1982): 65–80 (arguing that Jewish women could initiate divorce, so Mark 10:11–12 need not be read as a Gentile-audience adaptation), answered by Eduard Schweizer, EvTh 42 (1982): 294–300. The upshot is that wife-initiated divorce among Jews was exceptional and often deemed illegitimate, but genuinely attested — so the clause does not by itself require a non-Jewish setting. ↩
For the dominical reading — that the wife-clause targets the Herodian scandal rather than betraying a Gentile redaction — see Larry W. Hurtado, Mark (New International Biblical Commentary; Hendrickson, 1989), holding that Jesus may prohibit both wives and husbands from initiating divorce precisely so as to condemn Herod and Herodias; France, Mark, 393 (n. 1 above), likewise ties the clause to the Herodias case; and, on the authenticity of the saying in its Herodian setting more broadly, Craig S. Keener, …And Marries Another (Hendrickson, 1991), and Robert H. Stein, Mark (BECNT; Baker, 2008), on 10:11–12. The removal of the premise that a Jewish woman could not divorce (n. 7) is what lets the clause be both Jewish and dominical. ↩